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Abstract
Cyber-attacks have become common occurrences which have an impact on all
aspects of life ranging from business transactions to personal communications.
Alarmingly, coordinated cyber-attacks are increasingly targeting politicians and their
associates, political campaigns, political organizations and the broader public with
political messaging. Given the novelty of these new forms of attacks, little is known of
their potential impact. This thesis argues that states, state-directed actors, or non-state
actors are disrupting, altering or influencing the electoral process in democratic states
through coordinated cyber operations. It further argues that the purpose is to increase
hyper-partisanship and erode the legitimacy of democratically-elected leaders.
A quantitative study analyzing the data from a test group of consolidated
democracies which had experienced these types of cyber operations displayed declining
confidence in both their national governments and the honesty of their elections. By
investigating the most prominent and verifiable cyber-attacks against state election
processes, a connection between the attacks and Russia’s state intelligence services
became apparent. Further research revealed Russian intelligence agencies’ historic use of
covert ‘active measures’ and their current efforts to incorporate cyber operations within
those measures, thus increasing active measures’ versatility and efficiency. Historic and
geopolitical insight provided by an ex-official from a former Soviet Republic
contextualized how these new cyber operations could be used to advance Russian
geopolitical objectives.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Many national security experts and academics are deeply concerned over the
threat posed by cyber operations. While various forms of cyber operations have become
common, the alleged use of coordinated cyber operations to affect national elections in
democratic countries is a new type of occurrence. As a result, there has been little in the
way of academic research conducted on this new type of vulnerability. Given the limited
breadth of research material, this thesis will examine public survey data collected from
states which have allegedly been the victims of a coordinated cyber operations targeting
national elections with the goal of directing electoral outcomes. Coordinated cyber
operations appear to have been designed to manipulate a population’s perceptions of
elected leaders’ legitimacy and partisanship in their national political debates.
The issue of electoral interference in democratic states through the use of
coordinated cyber operations is of critical importance. Attempts to interfere in states’
electoral processes, whether or not they are successful, undermine the legitimacy of the
electoral process which is the bedrock of a functioning democratic state. If the outcome
of an electoral process is called into question, there will be an erosion of the legitimacy
that the electoral process bestows on democratically elected leaders. In addition, foreign
states may gain undue influence in electing leaders who favor the foreign state’s policy
positions. This erosion of legitimacy may lead to increased hyper-partisanship and can
sow doubts among the national electorate regarding the policy decisions of any elected
leader.
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In researching this thesis, I aim to answer and provide insight into the following
questions:
•

What is the evidence that there have been verifiable attempts by states, statedirected actors, or non-state actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral
process in democratic states through coordinated cyber operations?

•

What were the methods used by states, state-directed actors, or non-state
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states
through coordinated cyber operations?

•

What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states
through coordinated cyber operations?
I argue here that states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors are disrupting,

altering or influencing the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated
cyber operations. I further argue that the purpose is to increase hyper-partisanship and
erode the legitimacy of democratically-elected leaders. This can also lead to undue
influence and promote candidates that support a foreign state’s preferred policy positions.
Russian influence in Eastern Europe is a prime example.
This thesis will rely heavily on quantitative data from global surveys that track
voter’s perceptions of elected leader’s legitimacy and their views of national partisanship
politics in democratic countries. The thesis compares the voter’s perceptions of elected
leader’s legitimacy and their views of national partisanship politics, comparing results
taken prior to alleged cyber operations designed to interfere in elections with perceptions
after such allegations. It will also compare the data from democratic countries in which
5

there have been allegations of cyber operations used to conduct electoral interference
with a control group of democracies. Qualitative analyses will be under taken to explain
the data’s results. Furthermore, qualitative sources will be used to supplement the
quantitative survey data where possible.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter reviews the existing literature surrounding cyber operations and how
states are responding to the new challenges and opportunities they present. It also
provides an overview which places cyber operations within the broader context of
international relations and international humanitarian law. Further, this chapter addresses
the surveys used to explain their significance in this paper’s findings. While chapter three
provides specific definitions for various disputed terms such as ‘cyber-attack’ and ‘cyber
operation’ as they will be used in this paper, the language utilized here reflects that of the
experts and scholars being cited.
Discussions around cyber-attacks and cybersecurity have become increasingly
common in a range of different forums including academic research, national security
debates, in the media and in corporate and nonprofit organizations’ guidelines. Yet, in
this nascent field there is little consensus on precise terminology. Ambiguous terms like
‘cyber-attacks’ can be used to describe attacks ranging from state-sponsored, enduring
sophisticated and multipronged campaigns against rival states to attacks in which one
rogue actor gaining unauthorized access to a private citizen’s email account. Considering
the disparity, it is important to begin with a compilation of existing definitions for
cybersecurity and information security. In 2014, Robert Morgus and Tim Maurer
compiled definitions as they are utilized by various governments, international
organizations and research institutes.1 To illustrate this diversity, there are forty-seven

1

Morgus, Robert and Tim Maurer. Compilation of Existing Cybersecurity and Information Security
Related Definitions. New America Foundation, October 2014.
https://www.giplatform.org/sites/default/files/Compilation%20of%20Existing%20Cybersecurity%20and%
20Information%20Security%20Related%20Definition.pdf.
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different entries for ‘cyber security’ offered by a variety of states, agencies and
organizations often embracing multiple definitions.
Cyber Policy and Practice
For those unversed in cybersecurity issues, Peter Singer and Allan Friedman’s
work Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know offers a
comprehensive overview of cybersecurity and many of its associated issues, including: a
basic overview of cyberspace and security, categorization of types of cyberattacks,
cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyberterrorism, cyberpiracy, the intersection of cyber issues
and foreign policy as well as the institutions and bodies that govern cyberspace.2 Equally
noteworthy, in 2013 the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
released its Cyber Index which offers a useful and comprehensive guide to state civilian
policy positions and state military doctrines as well as international and regional
organization’s positions on cyber security.3
In Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, William Lynn, a
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense situates all the potential and theoretical
cybersecurity threats in everyday practice. The emergence of cyber warfare has created
an asymmetrical imbalance in which a relatively small number of determined actors can
identify and exploit vulnerabilities in an adversary’s cyber infrastructures with a
relatively low cost and risk.4 Further escalating this threat is the multitude of potential

2

Singer, Peter, and Allen Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014. pp. 35 – 62.
3
Lewis, James A., and Götz Neuneck. “The Cyber Index: International Security Trends and Realities.”
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2013.
www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber-index-2013-en-463.pdf.
4
Lynn, William J. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 5, September 2010. pp. 97–108. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/20788647.
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targets which can include: national security agencies, governmental agencies, financial
institutions, commercial operations, transportation networks, critical infrastructure and
power utilities. The potential impact of such cyber-attacks could range from the slow
erosion of U.S. military preparedness and its global economic competitiveness to the
massive loss of life and property. The article also outlines the Pentagon’s efforts to
respond to these challenges with the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010 which
consolidated the cyber operations of the various branches of the military under one
unified operation.5 The Cyber Command was tasked with the security of all defense and
military operations in cyberspace, coordinating the use of the resources dedicated to
cyber defense and building partnerships with the U.S. intelligence agencies.6 Beyond
greater internal coordination, the Pentagon is also leveraging the U.S. tech industries’
expertise to identify and address vulnerabilities in civilian cyber infrastructure.
International Law and Cyber Norms
The most thorough and up-to-date examination of international law in relation to
cyber security was produced in 2017 by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence in a follow up edition titled the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Operations. The manual builds off the first edition which was
released in 2013 and identifies 154 well-established legal rules as they apply to governing
cyber operations. Reflecting the fact that cyber operations are becoming an increasingly
common tool used by states, the first version focused on the evolving use of the most
severe cyber operations which could invoke the use of force and right to self-defense.

Lynn, William J. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89,
no. 5, September 2010. pp. 97–108. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/20788647.
6
Ibid.
5
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The second edition prioritizes a legal analysis for less severe, day-to-day cyber operations
and lays out a more comprehensive view of the various international and regional bodies
that govern and deliberate on cyberspace.7 Michael Schmitt, the renowned cyber scholar
and lead editor on the Tallinn Manual projects also contributed to the classification of
cyber conflicts. In the 2013 article, Classification of Cyber Conflict, Schmitt uses the
guidelines laid out in the Geneva Conventions to analyze and illustrate the different
classifications using the 2008 international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia as
a case study.8 This article’s most significant contribution was outlining the factors that
elevate the significance of a cyber conflict and specifying the appropriate
countermeasures the defending nation could employ.
In Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity Martha Finnemore and Duncan
Hollis argue that despite the novelty of the cyber realm, many of factors that are critical
in the norm development process remain the same.9 They emphasize that norms already
exist in the form of national regulations, international laws and professional standards
and that no one set of ‘norms’ could address the wide array of issues which affect such a
diverse community. They argue that only a pluralistic, multi-stakeholder form of
governance could work on a platform as diffused as the internet. By using a mixture of
incentives, persuasion and socialization methods they assert that norms can be developed
and change online habits. By applying the rich social science literature on norm

7

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
http://csrcl.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/csrcl/files/9781107177222_frontmatter.pdf.
8
Schmitt, Michael, N. “Classification of Cyber Conflict.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 17,
no. 2, 8 August 2012. pp. 245-260. https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/17/2/245/852811.
9
Finnemore, Martha, and Duncan B. Hollis. “Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity.” American
Journal of International Law, vol. 110, no. 3, July 2016. pp. 425–479. JSTOR.
www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425.

10

construction, Finnemore and Hollis tend not to see norms as an end product, but rather as
a process and a support more for participants and different forums in the dialog
surrounding the governance of the cyber realm.
A 2017 publication by UNIDIR, The United Nations, Cyberspace and
International Peace and Security: Responding to Complexity in the 21st Century, outlines
international organization’s efforts in the normative process surrounding state behavior
towards Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).10 While primarily
addressing the work of the General Assembly and the UN Group of Governmental
Experts (GGE), the publication also looked at the role of regional organizations and
confidence building measures to ensure stability of the ICT environment and highlighting
where on-going sources of disagreement exist.
Given the range of international issues and disagreements that stem from
cybersecurity, many experts in the field have advocated for a cyber treaty convention.
One leading scholar, Rex Hughes, a fellow for cyber security at Cambridge University,
wrote A Treaty for Cyber Space in 2010 to address these specific concerns.11 Hughes’
piece, surveying several military officials and cyber security experts, asserts that the next
major interstate conflict is likely to begin in the cyber realm as long as there are no
established expectations of cyber conduct nor mechanisms to deescalate a cyber
conflict.12 The article puts forward the aspects Hughes sees as necessary for an enduring

Kavanagh, Camino. “The United Nations, Cyberspace and International Peace and Security: Responding
to Complexity in the 21st Century.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2017.
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-united-nations-cyberspace-and-international-peace-andsecurity-en-691.pdf.
11
Hughes, Rex. “A Treaty for Cyberspace.” International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March 2010. pp. 523–541.
https://citizenlab.ca/cybernorms2011/treaty.PDF.
12
Ibid.
10
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cyber treaty, while many are based on the Law of Armed Conflict, they are adapted to the
cyber realm and emphasize: only targeting infrastructure with military capabilities, strict
distinctions between military and civilian targets, nonuse of indiscriminate weapons and
respect for the principles of perfidy, neutrality and proportionality.13
In Cameron Brown and David Friedman’s 2014 article, entitled A Cyber Warfare
Convention? Lessons from the Conventions on Chemical and Biological Weapons, the
concept of a cyber treaty convention is also supported while applying additional insight
from previously successful conventions.14 While the authors, experts in the field of arms
control, concede that it is impossible to know how many states abandoned attempts to
acquire biological or chemical weapons as a result of these conventions, they point to
statistical evidence that supports their claims that the conventions had an overall impact
on declining proliferation numbers. They also address several issues first acknowledged
in the chemical and biological conventions that they believe would be applicable to a
cyber convention today, such as: independent verification and enforcement regimes,
monitoring of “dual use” technologies, and defining the scope of what is to be covered
under the convention.15 The article also outlines various shortcomings of the previous
conventions such as the role of non-state actors, which would benefit a cyber
convention.16

Hughes, Rex. “A Treaty for Cyberspace.” International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March 2010. pp. 523–541.
https://citizenlab.ca/cybernorms2011/treaty.PDF.
14
Brown, Cameron S., and David Friedman. “A Cyber Warfare Convention? Lessons from the
Conventions on Chemical and Biological Weapons.” Arms Control and National Security: New Horizons.
Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014. pp. 45–63.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
13
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Informational Warfare and Cyber Aggression
While this thesis seeks to uncover any and all alleged attempts to disrupt, alter or
influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated cyber campaigns,
Russian prolific and aggressive use of these new tactics has earned it the greatest scrutiny
from rival militaries, intelligence agencies, and governments as well as cyber experts and
increasingly academics. The most comprehensive overview of how Russia has been
utilizing cyberwarfare to further its foreign policy agenda was produced by the U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January, 2018. The report, Putin’s Asymmetric
Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security,
offers a detailed examination of how Russian President Vladimir Putin ascended to power
and how he adapted Soviet-era KGB techniques such as ‘active measures’ and ‘malign
influence operations’ to the modern era. In the process, he turned Moscow’s Federal
Security Services (FSB) into an extremely effective intelligence agency. 17 According to
the report, Putin used techniques such as staging disinformation campaigns against
adversaries, cultivating political extremist groups, and weaponizing both information and
energy supplies all with the goal of gaining leverage over adversaries.18 Once Putin had
perfected these methods on his domestic opposition, he began to employ them abroad to
advance his foreign policy goals. The report builds an in-depth chronology tracking these
Russian attempts to disrupt and manipulate international rivals from Russia’s near
abroad, in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, to its attempts in Western Europe and the

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and
Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (S.Prt.115-21). Report. 10 January 2018. 115th Cong. 2nd
sess. Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2018. (S.Prt.115-21).
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
18
Ibid.
17
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U.S.19 The report concludes with expert analysis on the methods of attack which proved
most effective and recommendations on how such efforts can be undermined when
Russia attempts to use them again.20
Yet, the U.S. is not alone in recognizing this new threat. In fact, many European
nations have suffered such attacks and have been attempting to address the problem for
months and years. The use of what many experts are calling “hybrid warfare” – a mixture
of conventional warfare supported by cyber aggression and disinformation campaigns in Russia’s assault on eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea served as a wakeup call
for European militaries and intelligence agencies.21 In a NATO report, The Next Phase of
Russian Information Warfare, Keir Giles, a leading Russian scholar at Chatham House,
analyzes how Russia will likely work to further integrate its cyber capabilities with its
conventional arms to devastating effect. Giles also outlines what NATO members are
doing to mitigate the effects and offers recommendations to help further those efforts.22
Polling Surveys & Data Collected
One of the primary data sources used in this thesis comes from Gallup Inc. in the
form of their annual World Poll and the U.S. Daily surveys. Gallup’s methodology aims
to collect data representative of the civilian population ages 15 and older by conducting
approximately 1,000 interviews in the respondent’s native language. With over 150

U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and
Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (S.Prt.115-21). Report. 10 January 2018. 115th Cong. 2nd
sess. Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2018. (S.Prt.115-21).
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.
20
Ibid.
21
Giles, Keir. “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare.” NATO Strategic Communications Centre
of Excellence, 2017. www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-warfare-keir-giles.
22
Ibid.
19
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countries included in the survey, Gallup conducts its interviews by phone in countries
where telephone coverage extends to at least 80% of the population while conducting
face-to-face interviews to maintain accurate national representation in countries which
this standard is not meet.23 Interview questions range in topic but inquire about the
respondent’s view of minorities and immigrants, freedom of the media, internet access,
economic conditions, global leaders, national leaders, corruption in business, corruption
in institutions, corruption in elected leaders as well as election integrity. The data
collected for this paper includes worldwide national aggregates for this data from 2006 to
2017 as well as national data broken down by annual income, educational attainment, age
and the urban-rural divide for nations hailing from NATO, the former-USSR and any
European nation not included in the former categories. The same polling data was also
collected on a sub-national, state-by-state basis in the United States.
Another crucial source of information collected for this thesis comes from
Edelman, a consultancy firm which has produced the annual Edelman Trust Barometer
since 2001. Edelman’s methodology includes collecting polling data from 28 countries
via online surveys. Their data is broken into two categories: the ‘Mass Population’ which
is collected from 1,150 respondents (ages18 years and older) per country which
represents 85% of those polled and an ‘Informed Public’ which is collected from at least
200 respondents per country and represents 15% of those polled.24 In addition, the
‘Informed Public’ must meet four criteria including: those who fall within the age range
of 25 – 64, be college-educated, represent the top 25% of household income per age
“How Does Gallup’s Global Poking Work?” Gallup.com. www.news.gallup.com/poll/128189/Gallupglobal-polling-work.aspx.
24
“2018 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report.” Edelman Trust Barometer 2018 Annual Global Study,
Edelman. www.edelman.com/trust-barometer.
23
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group in each country and report significant media consumption and engagement in
business news and public policy.25 The data is collected from more than 33,000
respondents globally and fields questions about a respondent’s trust in institutions
including: specific industries and sectors of the economy as well as the business
community at large, the media, NGOs and national governments. Furthermore, the survey
asks additional questions for each institution in an attempt to understand the factors that
have an impact on the population’s trust in a specific institution.26
The final survey included here comes from the Pew Research Center which has
produced its annual Global Attitudes Survey in 91 countries since 2014. Pew’s
methodology employs both face-to-face (when necessary to attain a representative
national survey) and phone interviews in the native language with an average of 1,000
respondents per country.27 While the Global Attitudes Survey asks many questions
regarding the respondent’s economic outlook and view on global trends, it also offers
insight on a respondent’s attitudes towards global organizations and institutions, various
world leaders and the countries they represent.28
Building a Comprehensive View
Together these sources help to build a more complete picture of the threat posed
by cyber aggression and help illustrate the effects it has on government and their citizens.
This thesis contributes to the debate by adding structure to the opaque field of cyber

“2018 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report.” Edelman Trust Barometer 2018 Annual Global Study,
Edelman. www.edelman.com/trust-barometer.
26
Ibid.
27
Wormald, Benjamin. “International Survey Methodology.” Pew Research Center, 26 June 2017.
www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-survey-research/international-methodology/globalattitudes-survey/all-country/all-year.
28
Ibid.
25
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aggression and defense. It brings clarity by indexing the different methods and tactics that
have been used against democratic states’ governments, political parties, individual
political actors, electorates at large and of course their electoral processes. Separately, the
sources provide alarming but disparate aspects of the threat from cyber aggression. Yet
when viewed comprehensively as different aspects of a multipronged assault on
democratic institutions globally, they establish an urgent need for a collective and
proactive response from all those who value democratic governance.
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Chapter Three: Overcoming Definitional Fog
In order to properly situate this thesis within the wider conversation surrounding
cybersecurity, it is necessary to establish definitions and clarify concepts as they are to be
used within this context. For organizational purposes, the definitions and concepts will be
broken into two categories: intelligence operations and cyber aggression and security.
This distinction will help to show how many of the modern techniques for cyber
aggression and defense have been adapted as yet another set of tools, albeit very effective
tools, used within the larger context of intelligence operations. For terms or concepts that
have multiple definitions, this thesis uses the most applicable or widespread usage.
Intelligence Operations
One of the keys to understanding how states, and in particular Russia, have taken
advantage of cyberspace requires an understanding of the intelligence agencies which
have been making use of the new technologies. The so-called Gerasimov Doctrine and
the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ both explain why Russia and others following Russia’s
lead have embraced cyber technology so thoroughly.29 Andrew Monaghan writing for the
US Army War College in 2016 provided a definition for hybrid warfare which outlines
the concept in great detail. Hybrid warfare exists “between war and peace” and makes
use of “Russian asymmetric challenges such as economic manipulation, an extensive and
powerful disinformation and propaganda campaign, the fostering of civil disobedience
and even insurrection and the use of well-supplied paramilitaries. In sum, Russian hybrid

Galeotti, Mark. “The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War.” In Moscow's Shadows, 6 July
2014. www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-nonlinear-war/.
29
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warfare as widely understood in the West represents a method of operating that relies on
proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and to maximize confusion and
uncertainty. Conventional force is often obliquely mentioned as a supplementary feature,
but the main feature of hybrid warfare is that it remains below the threshold of the clear
use of armed force. Hybrid warfare is thus tantamount to a range of hostile actions of
which “military force is only a small part, or ‘measures short of war’ that seek to deceive,
undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize societies, to coerce or replace sovereign
governments and to disrupt or alter an existing regional order.”30 This definition of hybrid
warfare is the essence of the Gerasimov Doctrine, a phrase first used in an article
published in Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, the Military-Industrial Courier in 2014 by
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and illustrates how deeply this
concept is embedded within the Russian leadership.31 However, as some scholars have
found issues with attributing the doctrine to Gerasimov and even that it constitutes a
doctrine, this thesis will mark use of Monaghan’s widely accepted definition of hybrid
warfare.32
Within Monaghan’s definition of hybrid warfare, he describes the use of
asymmetric challenges to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize
societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments and to disrupt or alter an existing
regional order. Monaghan is describing what Russian and Soviet intelligence officers
called Aktivinyye meropriatia, or active measures. Writing extensively on the history of

Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’.” Parameters, The US Army War
College, 2016. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2015-16/9_Monaghan.pdf.
31
Galeotti, Mark. “The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War.” In Moscow's Shadows, 6 July
2014. www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-nonlinear-war/.
32
Ibid.
30
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the Soviet Union and its intelligence services, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti (KGB), Chiristopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin describe active
measures developing alongside the agency which was established in 1954.33 Andrew and
Mitrokhin leave the definition as broad as possible, considering the malleable nature of
active measures, defining them as Soviet efforts “to influence the course of world events”
with operations ranging from media manipulation to various degrees of violence. While
the thesis will use this broader definition, more recent attempts to define the concept
include individual operations includes: propaganda, media manipulation, political
influence, disinformation, deception, use of forgery, funding of extremist and opposition
groups, spreading conspiracy theories and rumor, cyber-attacks, espionage and
assassination.34 While the broader definition offered by Andrew and Mitrokhin is better
suited for active measures’ adaptable nature, these operations all fall under the larger
umbrella of active measures and offer clarity on what can be described as an active
measure operation.
Martin Libicki, a prominent cybersecurity expert working for RAND Corporation,
noted the difficulty with another equally important concept, information warfare. In 2007,
he wrote “that well over a decade after the topic of information warfare broke out into the
open, its conceptual underpinnings remain weak and largely unsatisfactory, with fierce
battles raging over neologisms and definitions.”35 Considering the definitional variations

33

Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and
the Secret History of the KGB. Penguin Press, 1999. https://archive.org/details/TheSwordAndTheShieldTheMitrokhinArchiveAndTheSecretHistoryOfTheKGB.
34
Sipher, John. “Russian Active Measures and the 2016 Election Hack.” The Cipher Brief, 20 December
2017. www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/russian-active-measures-2016-election-hack.
35
Libicki, Martin. Conquest in Cyberspace, National Security and Information Warfare, 2007, Cambridge
University Press, pp. 17 – 19.
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for information warfare, this thesis contextualizes it as a component of hybrid warfare
and conducted through the use of active measures. M.M. Taraskin and S.A. Cheshuin,
who both contributed to Russia’s National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
adopted in 1999, wrote an article in 2009 for the journal, Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh
Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences) which described information
warfare.36 The authors define information warfare as a “struggle in the information
sphere to impact the opposing side’s information objects and protect one’s own
information objects from such impact.”37 They continue to make an important distinction,
noting that information warfare includes, “all the means and methods of impacting
information, information-psychological, and information-technological objects and
information resources to achieve the objectives of the attacking side.”38 The distinction
between information-psychological and information-technical can be explained as the use
of the media to impact the consciousness of individuals and groups as opposed to the use
of software and communication technologies to disrupt mass media as well as military
and civilian information networks.39
Malign influence operations or simply influence operations, are another type of
active measure that is crucial to understanding attempts to disrupt or influence elections
but suffers from definitional ambiguity. An in-depth examination conducted by a team of
researchers from the RAND Corporation in 2009 provides the most inclusive definition
which again is beneficial given active measures adaptive nature. They described

36

Thomas, Timothy. Recasting the Red Star. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavensworth: 2011. pp.
142. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/RecastingRedStar_2015.pdf.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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influence operations as “the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of
national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in
peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviours, (sic) or
decisions by foreign target audiences that further [a nation’s] interests and objectives.”40
Given this wide spectrum within influence operations, it is also clarifying to establish the
different types of propaganda used to advance the operation. In Propaganda and
Persuasion, Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell outline propagandas severity based on
color. They describe white propaganda as coming from a “source that is identified
correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate…Although what
listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to
convince the audience that the sender is the ‘good guy’ with the best ideas and political
ideology.”41 While black propaganda also known as disinformation is described as
“credited to a false source, and it spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions.”42 Falling in
between those extremes exists gray propaganda, in which “the source may or may not be
correctly identified, and the accuracy of information is uncertain.”43
Given the long history of intelligence operations, difficulties with definitions can
arise for a variety of reasons, including translation issues and imprecision by those in the
media. With these definitions describing various aspects of intelligence operations firmly
established, it is possible to pivot to cyber aggression and security which have become an
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integral part of modern intelligence operations. Yet, here too, definitional imprecision has
led to a lack of clarity on the part of the public which is only slowly being reversed as
cybersecurity becomes a more common concern for society.
Cyber Aggression & Security
The most basic definitions set the perimeters of the discussion on cyber issues.
“Cyberspace” as was recognized in the 2014 Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms is “a global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems,
and embedded processors and controllers.”44 While a “cyber-attack” is understood by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology as “an attack, via cyberspace, targeting an
enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or
maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the
integrity of the data or stealing controlled information.”45 This definition of cyber-attack
proves most relevant as it accounts for the increasing nuance of cyber-attacks and does
not exclude the possibility of maliciously controlling or destroying controlled information
as a form of attack.
Yet, even with this inclusive definition of cyber-attacks, it is noteworthy that
many international security organizations, NATO included, are moving towards the more
common use of cyber operations. As NATO’s Tallinn Manual on the International Law
44

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Washington DC: March 2018. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
45
U.S. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Glossary of Key
Information Security Terms. Washington DC: 2013.
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf.

23

Applicable to Cyber Warfare published in 2013 indicates, cyber operations are “the
employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or
by the use of cyberspace.”46 This increasing preference for describing actions as cyber
operations rather than cyber-attacks is an indication of cyber operation’s increasing
complexity. Part of that complexity, is related to the rise of “internet trolls” or just
“trolls” who are responsible for cyber operations. An internet troll in its most benevolent
form can be “a person who posts incendiary comments with the express purpose of
provoking an argument.”47 NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence researchers have
created a new term, the “hybrid troll,” to acknowledge the trolls which operate as “hired,
pro-Russian trolls, communicate a particular ideology and, most importantly, operate
under the direction and orders of a particular state or state institution.”48 The researchers
claim while a standard troll has “no apparent instrumental purpose,” “the aim of hybrid
trolls has been to promote the Kremlin’s interests and portray Russia as a positive force
against the ‘rotten West’ and the US hegemony.”49
These hybrid trolls are also extremely well equipped. One of the tools at their
disposal is what is known as “automated internet bots” or “bots”, and in particular, one
class of internet bot known as the “Socialbot.” Techopedia offers a concise definition for
internet bot as “software that performs an automated task over the Internet. More
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specifically, a bot is an automated application used to perform simple and repetitive tasks
that would be time-consuming, mundane or impossible for a human to perform.”50 For
socialbots, Techopedia offers a more fulsome definition, which is indicative of the
controversy socialbots cause within the tech industry, it describes them as:
A type of bot that controls a social media account. Like all bots, a
socialbot is automated software. The exact way a socialbot replicates
depends on the social network, but unlike a regular bot, a socialbot spreads
by convincing other users that the socialbot is a real person. If not
malicious, most would at least argue that socialbots are unethical.
After all, their whole point of social networking is for actual
humans to connect. Whether or not a socialbot actually steals data or is
just done for amusement of the creator, the fact of the matter is that a
socialbot needs to trick a real user in order to spread. … Socialbots are
most common in Twitter, though there also have been experiments with
Facebook bots. Given the design of Twitter with short messages, retweeting, following etc., it's actually not too difficult for a socialbot to
appear human. Identity theft is a huge concern with socialbots, but what
really differs from other forms of malware is the trust factor that exists in
social networks. This can serve to help the socialbot spread, but also
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brings up questions as to whether a botnet of socialbots could influence
external events.”51
To add to their effectiveness, hybrid trolls will also employ large
numbers of socialbots in what is called a “botnet.” Techopedia again offer
a succinct definition, describing botnets as “a group of computers
connected in a coordinated fashion for malicious purposes. … These bots
form a network of compromised computers, which is controlled by a third
party and used to transmit malware or spam, or to launch attacks.52
Hybrid trolls, working under the direction of a state, are often, reportedly,
organized into teams and provided with work space and schedules to maximize their
efficiency.53 While sources are incredibly difficult to come by as no nation is willing to
confirm the existence of clandestine cyber operation facilities, journalists working for the
Russian independent newsmagazine RBC were able to uncover details through a sting
operation. Polina Rusyaeva, Andrey Zakharov, and Ludmila Savchuk gained employment
at what has been described as the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg Russia and
shared the details of the experience with Western journalists to further promote their
discoveries.54 The journalists claim that the agency employed up to 400 hybrid trolls and
enjoyed a monthly budget of at least 20 million rubles (approximately $400,000) a
month.55 Their accounts offer intimate details and if credible confirm many of the details
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offered by security firms and intelligence agencies about Russia’s state-sponsored cyber
operations.
Recognizing the growing role of cyber operations as a critical aspect within
influence operations, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence COE researchers coined the
term “influence cyber operations (ICO).” They define ICOs as “encompass activities
undertaken in cyberspace affecting the logical layer of cyberspace with the intention of
influencing attitudes, behaviours, or decisions of target audiences.”56 Some of the
verifiable methods used to accomplish these ICOs is documented by TrendMicros,
SecureWorks and Microsoft and addressed in following chapters include structured query
language (SQL) injections, spear-phishing emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks,
data dumps (or political doxing) and astroturfing. As not all these methods are commonly
known, they will be defined to ensure clarity in future chapters. SQL injections and
spear-phishing emails are methods to gain unauthorized access to a target’s database. An
SQL injection occurs when an “attacker can execute malicious SQL statements (also
commonly referred to as a malicious payload) that control a web application’s database
server,”57 and represents one of the most common ways malicious actors gain access to a
private database. Similarly, a spear-phishing email grants perpetrators access to the
target’s private database through the use of “fraudulent emails, containing malicious
code, target specific organizations in an effort to gain access to confidential
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information.”58 A denial-of-service attack often requires the use of botnets but uses brute
force to “make an online service unavailable by overwhelming it with traffic from
multiple sources.”59 The remaining methods, data dumps (or political doxing) and
astroturfing make use of stolen and controversial information or disinformation to further
the ICO’s objective. A data dump, which has also been described as a form of doxing,
entails the release of potentially stolen information at a time when it is determined to
have the greatest repercussions on the victim.60 While astroturfing, playing of the concept
of grass root organizations, attempts to supporting a divisive group or causes through the
use of botnets and hybrid trolls.61
Together, these sections offer a comprehensive overview of terms related to
intelligence operations and cyber aggression and security which are relevant for the
following chapters. Unfortunately, both the fields of intelligence and cyber security are
complex and the precise meaning of a term or phrase can be diluted when used
improperly by the broader public. By providing the definitions and the reasoning behind
why certain definitions were chosen, this chapter offers greater clarity and specificity on
subjects which have remained opaque to the wider public.
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Chapter Four: Types of Cyber Operations
While this thesis broadly identifies the role of cyber operations in disrupting and
influencing elections in democratic states, the common denominator in these cyber
operations has been the Russian Federation. Due to limitations in publicly available
information, this thesis does not attempt to attribute specific operations against
democratic states’ elections to Russia. However, given the depth of literature and data
documenting Russian involvement, a great deal of clarity on the different types of cyber
operations can be gained by examining verifiable Russian cyber operations meant to
disrupt or influence elections in the U.S. and Europe.
Testifying before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing on Russian
interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential election, former Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper Jr. provided the lawmakers present with the collective
assessment of the FBI, CIA and NSA. Clapper explained “that the Russian government
pursued a multifaceted influence campaign in the run-up to the election, including
aggressive use of cyber capabilities.”62 Later in the hearing, in response to an assertion by
Senator John Kennedy of Louisiana that the Russians had been running these types of
campaigns for years, Clapper rejected the assertion, indicating that “this is unprecedented
in terms of its aggressiveness and the multifaceted campaign.”63 Likewise, in a statement
prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2017, Director of
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Janis Sarts explained how new
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technological developments made these cyber operations attractive because they were
increasingly fast, cheap, and geographically unlimited.64 Director Sarts, further supported
this point by putting forward a chronology of cyber operations which targeted European
elections as documented by NATO StratCom COE including efforts in: Estonia in 2009,
Ukraine in 2014, Germany in 2015, Montenegro in 2016, and the Netherlands, Norway
and France in 2017.65
A crucial element in understanding cyber operations and why they prove effective
is related to the actual perpetrator of the operation. These perpetrators of cyber
operations, or trolls as they’re know in cyber security parlance, can operate from any
nondescript location with an internet connection, are relatively inexpensive to employ
and do not require extensive investment to maximize their cyber capabilities.66 Despite
claims from the Kremlin denying any state involvement in cyber operations targeting
other country’s domestic elections, there is mounting evidence that indicates the
existence of Russian state-sponsored facilities designed to conduct cyber operations on a
massive level.67 The activities of Russian-sponsored cyber operation facilities, or troll
farms again as they’re referred to in cyber security parlance, has been documented and
tracked by several European intelligence agencies, including the United Kingdom’s
House of Commons Defence Committee, Czech Republic’s Security Information Service
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(BIS), Estonia’s Kaitsepolitseiamet (Estonian Intelligence Services) and Sweden’s
Sakerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Services) for the past several year. 68697071
One of the most authoritative and thorough source of information on the existence
of these Kremlin-sponsored facilities comes from the U.S. Special Council investigation
of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections led by Robert Mueller III. In a recent
indictment, Mueller’s team charged the Russian organization, the Internet Research
Agency LLC, and thirteen Russians affiliated with the organization for having
“knowingly and intentionally conspired … to defraud the United States by impairing,
obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the government through fraud and
deceit for the purpose of interfering with the U.S. political and electoral processes,
including the presidential election of 2016.”72 The indictment goes into granular detail,
outlining the agency’s organizational structure, protocols, budget and its work in the
creation of false American personas, social media accounts, groups and events.73 And
while it’s important to remember that an indictment is only a formal accusation brought
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about by a federal prosecutor, the incredible specificity of the charges in the indictment
indicate the underlying sources were provided by cooperative U.S. intelligence agencies.
As new details and sources on the methods used to interfere in the U.S. 2016
presidential election emerge, former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper’s
choice of the phrase “multifaceted campaign” appears exceedingly appropriate. To
organize the different types of cyber operations utilized to interfere in elections, it is
clarifying to establish the types of cyber operations based on their intended targets. With
currently available public information, it’s possible to create three categories of
operations: cyber operations which targeted voting equipment and election infrastructure,
cyber operations which targeted elected officials, political operatives and political parties
and cyber operations which targeted the public. The following details the specific
operations which fall in each category.
Targeting Voting Equipment and Election Infrastructure
As it has been seen elsewhere, the available public data on intrusions into voting
equipment and its online infrastructure is limited but becoming increasingly available
through the declassification of information. It is reasonable that few nations want to
provide details of the vulnerabilities that exist within their electoral infrastructure and
voter registration databanks. However, it is noteworthy that this method of compromising
the physical election hardware does not seem to be the preferred method as it is detectible
and not as effective as other methods yet to be discussed.
In the U.S. there have been several sources which implicate Russian actors in the
probing of US election-related infrastructure and voter registration systems across various
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states. The Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Cybersecurity and Communications at the
DHS, Jeanette Manfra claimed the nation’s cyber systems are under constant attack,
indicating the DHS had evidence of cyber-enabled scanning and probing of election
related infrastructure originating from servers operated by Russian company. 74 In
testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Manfra continued to describe
unclassified FBI material which gave specific details regarding a cyber-attack in July
2016 that resulted in a State Board of Elections website being compromised.75
That FBI material, originally classified because it contained actionable IP
addresses, was a flash warning issued by the FBI Cyber Division to all the states’ Board
of Elections. In the bulletin, the FBI warns of two cyber-attacks in July and August 2016
against unnamed (but since identified as Arizona76 and Illinois77) states’ Board of
Election websites.78 The bulletin offers the following technical details:
In late June 2016, an unknown actor scanned a state's Board of
Election website for vulnerabilities using Acunetix, and after identifying a
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection (SQLi) vulnerability, used
SQLmap to target the state website. The majority of the data exfiltration
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occurred in mid-July. There were seven suspicious IPs and penetration
testing tools Acunetix, SQLMap, and DirBuster used by the actor.79
The Structured Query Language (SLQ), as a reminder, is “computer language
designed for eliciting information from databases.” 80 While the SLQ Injection (SLQI) is
the process of finding vulnerabilities in the SLQ and inserting malicious code giving the
user the ability to tamper with the existing data across the database, in this case, the
databases maintained by both Arizona and Illinois’s Board of Election.81 It’s also helpful
to understand that the tools, Acunetix, SQLMap, and DirBuster are commonly used
opensource web tools. They can be used to access and manage a database’s SQL, exploit
the vulnerabilities within that database and insert malicious SQLIs, and map that
database’s structure, directories and files, respectively.828384 Equally important, all seven
of the listed IP address in the bulletin have been independently identified and flagged as
associated with Russian government cyber actors and Russian malicious cyber activity by
the DHS’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).85 The most crucial
piece of information being the data exfiltration, which in an open letter to the state
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Election Authorities the Director of Voting and Registration Systems for Illinois State
Board of Elections, Kyle Thomas, identified as an unknown amount of voter records.86
In various European elections as well, there is evidence of successful attempts to
compromise election infrastructure. One of the first well documented cyber-attacks in
Europe occurred in 2014 prior to the Ukrainian national elections and also serves as a
perfect example of what military experts have called hybrid warfare.87 The context of the
attack is critical. On November 21st, 2013, Ukrainian Pro-Russian President Viktor
Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement
with the European Union which sparked escalating protests across the country.88 By
February, 24th, 2014, 84 Ukrainians had died in the protests, a new interim president was
named in Kiev, new presidential elections were scheduled for May and most importantly
Yanukovych had fled to escape a warrant for his arrest over his involvement in the death
of the protesters.89 Almost simultaneously as Yanukovych went into hiding, unrest and
conflict fueled by allegedly pro-Russian separatists began to spread in Crimea and the
eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.9091 These alleged pro-Russian Ukrainian
separatists forces which were later identified as partially composed of and heavily
Michael, Kathy. “Open Letter to the Illinois Election Authority from Kyle Thomas, Director-Voting and
Registration Systems, Illinois State Board of Elections.” Facebook, 20 July 2016.
www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1144387868951159&id=215366205186668.
87
Gorchinskaya, Katya, et al. “Authorities: Hackers Foiled in Bid to Rig Ukraine Presidential Election
Results.” KyivPost, 25 May 2014. www.kyivpost.com/article/content/may-25-presidentialelection/authorities-hackers-foiled-in-bid-to-rig-ukraine-presidential-election-results-349288.html.
88
Motyl, Alexander J. “Yanukovych Must Go.” Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2013.
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2013-12-11/yanukovych-must-go.
89
Karmanau, Yuras, and Maria Danilova. “Ukraine Issues Arrest Warrant for Missing Leader.” Yahoo!
News, 24 February 2014. www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-issues-arrest-warrant-missing-leader-123251908-finance.html.
90
Higgins, Andrew, and Steven Erlanger. “Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Crimea.” New York
Times, 27 February 2014. www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/world/europe/crimea-ukraine.html.
91
Satell, Greg. “5 Things You Should Know About Crisis in Ukraine.” Forbes, 1 February 2014.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/%202014/02/01/5-things-you-should-know-about-crisis-inukraine/#12d20d512120.
86

35

supported by the Russian Armed Forces, dragged the country into a prolonged, violent
conflict.92 By the time of the presidential elections in May the country was in chaos.
In this tumultuous atmosphere, an online group known as “CyberBerkut,” named
after the riot police unit which had been accused of brutality against protesters at the
onset of the unrest, began probing the Ukrainian Central Election Commission (CEC). 93
The attacks intended target was the election analytics system that aggregates voter data94.
While the technical details of the attack are scant, Volodymyr Zverev, Head of the State
Service for Special Communication and Information Security, told Ukrainian reports that
a virus had destroyed all of the internal data of the CEC on May 22.95 In the aftermath of
the attack it was discovered that in the attack, just three days prior to the election,
CyberBerkut had infiltrated the CEC’s election infrastructure, disabled the election
analytics system and released the details of the analytic system and personal contact
information from the election committee staff.96 While the CEC’s data had been backed
up earlier in the day, preventing the intended delay in election results, the attack stands as
one of the most brazen attempts to disrupt elections through the election infrastructure.97
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Similar attempts have been uncovered in other European capitals as well, in
particular Amsterdam. In the run up to the Netherlands’ 2017 general election, Foreign
Affairs Minister Bert Koenders warned that the Dutch General Intelligence and Security
Services (AIVD) were on the highest alert for cyber intrusion in the election.98 In fact, the
AIVD warned that “the Netherlands’ Highly developed ICT infrastructure makes our
nation an attractive channel for cyber-attacks.”99 Ultimately, after Minister of Home
Affairs Ronald Plasterk, issued a warning that there had been international indications
that the Russians were probing the elections, the government decided the prudent
decision was to forgo the electronic system and use traditional paper and pen methods.100
As it has been seen in these accounts, there are several weaknesses in targeting
the physical election infrastructure and voter registration databases. Primarily, country’s
intelligence agencies are constantly searching for these types of intrusions and they leave
a clear trail back to the perpetrator. As it will be seen in the following section, unlike
cyber operations that simply attempt to alter or interfere with the physical election
infrastructure, other types of cyber operations have proven more effective in influencing
elections’ outcomes and are better suited to take advantage of democratic societies’
internal divisions.
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Targeting Elected Officials, Political Operatives and Political Parties
Cyber operations which target elected officials or candidates, their staffs, political
operatives and political parties, due to the outcry of the victims of such operations, are
often the most publicized. While there have been a number of extremely high-profile
examples, notably in the U.S. and France, which fall within this type of operation, they
have also been used to great effect in Eastern Europe while avoiding excessive
international scrutiny. These operations are also often potent because there is frequently a
domestic constituency which finds the operation advantageous to its own objectives.
The most infamous instance of a cyber operation used against a political target
with the objective of disrupting or influencing an election occurred during the U.S. 2016
presidential election. The intense debate and scrutiny over this occurrence has also led to
a significant amounts of intelligence information being released to the public which has
served to inform this thesis. On January 6th, 2017, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence issued a comprehensive joint report in collaboration with the CIA, NSA and
FBI entitled “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. As indicated in the title, this report offered the
agencies’ collective assessment on Russia’s involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections but
also revealed the granular details of the Russian cyber operations.
The assessment indicated that in the early stages of the operation, “Russia’s
intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016
U.S. presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political
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parties.”101 This point suggests that in the earliest stages the operation was intended to
cause disruption to the election process, rather than assist any one candidate. The report
continues to name the Russian intelligence agency, the General Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate (GRU) as one of the main actors in the cyber operation and outlines its broad
efforts to collect information from “US primary campaigns, think tanks and lobbying
groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies.”102 The assessment claims that
the GRU had gained access to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks from
July, 2015 to June, 2016 through the use of personal email accounts of Democratic Party
officials and political figures and that by May they had used this access to exfiltrate large
volumes of data.103 The cyber security company, Secureworks, was able to track the
attack back to Russia intelligence affiliated IP addresses with moderate confidence. 104
Securework’s Counter Threat Unit analyzed 3,907 individual Gmail accounts and
corporate and organizational email accounts that use Gmail as a service associated with
the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and determined that the perpetrators used what is
known as a spear-phishing attack to gain entry to the DNC’s networks.105 The attack
involves sending deceptive emails to higher level staff members, prompting the victim to
enter security information to resolve a fictitious issue, upon providing the security
information the perpetrator gains access to the network. The Counter Threat Unit also
uncovered similar efforts associated with Germany’s Prime Minister Angela Merkel and
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rival candidates Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John Kasich
which again strongly indicates that the purpose of these operations was to disrupt the
election process.106
A similar operation took place during the 2017 French presidential election.
Context is quite important here. On the far-right, The Front National’s (FN) candidate
Marine Le Pen held a consolatory position on Russia.107 A Eurosceptic and ultranationalist, Le Pen had defended Russian action in Ukraine and Syria and called for a
“balanced” relationship between Russia and Western powers.108 While Emmanuel
Macron, considered a political centrist, held pro-EU views and had been supportive of the
EU sanctions placed on Russia over its aggression in eastern Ukraine.109 According to an
assessment report conducted in the aftermath of the operation by TrendMicro, a cyber
defense company, candidate Macron and his political party, La République En March!,
were targeted in cyber operations.110 The report describes similar methods as used in the
cyber operation that targeted the DNC, including the use of spear-phishing attacks against
higher level staff members to gain access to private information within the campaign’s
database.111 While the perpetrators were operating under a different moniker,
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PawnStorm, TrendMicro has claimed with fair confidence that the attack can be traced
back to Russian GRU affiliated IP addresses.112
The assessment which was released in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election,
indicated that “The Kremlin’s campaign aimed at the US election featured disclosures of
data obtained through Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state and local
electoral boards; and overt propaganda. Russian intelligence collection both informed and
enabled the influence campaign.”113 That final sentence is critical to understand how the
stolen data was then weaponized and used against the political organization from which it
was stolen. It also serves as a segue into the next the next type of cyber operation.
Targeting the Public
Evidence of cyber operations conducted against the broader public in an effort to
interfere in elections is becoming increasingly available. These types of cyber operations
are designed to influence the voting population and promote the most extreme views
within a society. In 2016, Pascal Brangetto and Matthijs Veenendaal of the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, proposed the term “Influence Cyber
Operations” (ICOs) for this new type of operation which adapted elements of influence
operations, a tool used by international intelligence services for decades, and integrated
them with emerged cyber operations.114 The advent of “cyberspace offers numerous
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possibilities for these kinds of coercive operations, which are designed to influence a
target audience by changing, compromising, destroying, or stealing information by
accessing information systems and networks.”115 Keir Giles, a senior fellow of the Russia
and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, specifies three ways ICOs prove effective: by
“both internally and externally focus[ing] media with a substantial online presence,” by
“target audiences on a broad front in their own language” and also by “use of social
media and online fora as a force multiplier to ensure Russian narratives achieve broad
reach and penetration.”116
One tool which acts as a force multiplier and amplifies the effect of ICOs is the
social bot.117 While social bots operate in a definitional fog, this thesis uses a definition
which focuses on certain qualifying aspects of the computer algorithm. These aspects
include: the program can be fully automated as well as partly controlled by human action,
autonomous agent-like action, an orientation toward a goal, can operate on multiple
modes of communication, and operates in a wider social media ecosystem.118 In a written
response to questioning by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Facebook’s
Vice President and General Counsel Colin Stretch claimed that “in October 2016, for
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example, we disabled about 5.8 million fake accounts in the United States”119 adding, “At
the time, our automated tooling did not yet reflect our knowledge of fake accounts
focused on social or political issues.”120 An admission, which as Senator Mark Warner
pointed out, could mean the numbers initially reported only account for a fraction of the
actual number of fake accounts.121 Stretch further claimed that learning from the US
election led to the detection of bots being used in European elections. He indicated that in
advance of the 2017 French presidential elections more than 30,000 accounts had been
exposed while prior to the 2017 German federal elections “tens of thousands” of accounts
had been uncovered.122 The report also noted while Facebook has been working
fastidiously to remove fraudulent accounts, it continued to uncover them on a daily
basis.123
Stretch also advised the lawmakers to examine the techniques used to amplify
divisive messages as outlined in the white papers on information operations released in
April, 2017. In its findings Facebook admitted that social bots were a tool utilized by
individuals, and as Facebook claims, Russian-linked accounts, to further advance
information operations on the platform.124 Facebook asserts that these accounts used
social bots to amplify their reach by: the masse creation of fake accounts, coordinated
sharing and reposting of content across multiple pages, coordinated and repeated
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commenting sometimes in a harassing manner, coordinated “likes” or reactions,
coordinated astroturfing of groups, creation of groups and pages with the specific intent
to spread sensational and bias headlines which often distorted facts and creations and
distribution of inflammatory and occasionally racist memes, manipulated photos and
video content.125 One of the most important findings, was the realization that while these
social bots can act entirely autonomously, they were more frequently used to promote and
amplify the content of a specific account which indicates that individual hybrid trolls
often operate with a network of social bots supporting the troll’s objective.
Yet, this activity is not contained solely to Facebook. Additional popular social
media outlets like Instagram, Reddit, Google, Twitter and YouTube have all reported
evidence of Russian troll farms’ activities on their platforms.126 In his statement to the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Stretch also gave a broader assessment of
the situation, explaining that “foreign actors, hiding behind fake accounts, abused our
platform and other internet services to try to sow division and discord—and to try to
undermine our election process— [which] is an assault on democracy.”127 In his
testimony, Stretch indicated that Russian hybrid trolls misrepresenting themselves as U.S.
citizens created and shared posts, paid to advertise and promote their specific pages, and
paid for specific advertisements to be seen in other users News Feeds.128 While at a
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different session of the same committee, the Acting General Counsel for Twitter, Sean
Edgett, recounted similar activities also occurring on Twitter’s platform.129 During the
testimony, Edgett also elaborated on the use of Russian spam, fake accounts and
automated bots on Twitter, all of which were used to amplify the reach of their
disinformation.130
A presentation from the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Richard Burr, also
demonstrated how these efforts to sow division among U.S. citizens could and on
occasion had moved from social media platforms to public space. His presentation
outlined how two Russian-sponsored groups, “Heart of Texas” and “United Muslims of
America” managed to organize rival rallies at the same location and time in Houston,
Texas which led to confrontation and disruption in the streets of an American city.131 A
presentation by the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Mark Warner, displayed
Russian-produced content by a group named “Army of Jesus” which featured Hillary
Clinton depicted as Satan in a boxing match with Jesus.132 Besides disparaging one of the
candidates, Senator Warner’s presentation also demonstrated how Russian-sponsored
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pages on social media platforms served to spread Russian disinformation more broadly
by linking users to pseudo-news websites also maintained by Russian accounts.133
Despite all the methods used to amplify divisive messages produced by hybrid
trolls, their most effective method of advancing an ICO may also be their most
straightforward, the data dump or, as it is sometime referred to, political doxing. As
described in the prior section, hybrid trolls have a variety of methods to gain
unauthorized access to candidates, political operators and political entities’ databases.
While these political actors are increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities and working to
protect their databases, it only takes a small weakness in a database’s SQL or one
inattentive staff member being deceived by a spear-phishing email for a determined
hybrid troll to gain entry. In fact, these two methods which are both exceedingly
common, were responsible for two of the most infamous data dumps to date. French
candidate Emmanuel Macron and his political party, La République En March!’s
database was breached through the use of a SQL injection, while in the U.S., the Clinton
campaign and the DNC’s were penetrated through the use of spear-phishing emails.
These data dumps are typically timed to ensure that the potentially damaging
information is released when it will have the greatest impact on the intended target. In the
case of Emmanuel Macron’s campaign this meant days before the election runoff with
Marine Le Pen and hours before an official election blackout which prevents the media
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from reporting on the campaigns.134 As seen in the 2016 DNC leak, the perpetrators also
go to great lengths to hid their identity which serves to obfuscate the true intention behind
making the data public. The GRU affiliated persona “Guccifer 2.0,” provided the data
with a third-party website, DCLeaks.com, which then moved the data along to Wikileaks
and the broader public.135 Finally, once the data reaches the public sphere, the hybrid
trolls with the assistance of botnets work in a coordinated manner to ensure it is amplified
and reaches as broadly as possible.136
As seen in this chapter, cyber operations are extremely adaptable and can be
useful to intelligence services in a number of different ways. By utilizing cyber
operations, a malicious actor or state can target election infrastructure, political
operatives, elected officials, political candidates, political organizations as well as the
broader public. While cyber operations can stand alone as a potent tool of intelligence
agencies, they also have been used to support other types of active measures such as
political influence operations and disinformation operations. Most alarmingly, there is no
indication that cyber operations’ versatility has reached its limit. In fact, it’s likely that as
social, political and business interactions increasingly transpire within cyberspace, cyber
operations will continue to find new vulnerabilities to exploit.
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Chapter Five: Purpose behind the Cyber Operations
As evidence of the Russian Federation’s use of cyber operations to disrupt or
influence elections has become increasingly verifiable, the key question still to be
answered is “why?” Why has Russia engaged in these cyber operations against elections?
What was the purpose behind these cyber acts? Fortunately, an examination of Soviet
history and current Russian national security doctrine offers an incredible amount of
insight which can help answer these questions.
Cyber operations designed to interfere in elections have been, by necessity,
largely conducted as covert operations. It is important to remember that the reliance of
aggressor states, in particular Russia, on covert operations like disinformation operations
and cyber operations are not demonstrations of military strength. They are rather an
adaptation meant to counter the superior conventional military strength of rival nations.
This assertion is well supported by national military expenditure data, as in 2016 Russia
spent under $83 billion on defense compared to the U.S. which spent over $611 billion.137
By comparison, the Russian defense expenditure makes it a closer rival to Saudi Arabia
which spent over $63 billion. Russia’s defense budget is also outmatched by the
combined expenditure of the United Kingdom and France which together spent just under
$113 billion on defense in 2016.138 Unable to oppose the U.S. and its European allies in a
conventional military confrontation, rival nations use nonconventional methods that are
available. Nonconventional or asymmetrical methods of warfare, both new and old, have
historically been the domain of state intelligence agencies. When considering the attack
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on democratic states’ elections, it is more helpful to view cyber acts as the newest type of
operation at the disposal of intelligence agencies rather than a new type of warfare.
Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union, have throughout its history
understood the crucial role nonconventional warfare could serve while facing a militarily
superior opponent. In 1920, Vladimir Lenin wrote:
The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the
utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and
obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any
conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and
among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various
countries and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest
opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary,
vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional.139
This mentality, of employing subversion, deception and manipulation to further the
group’s goals, made tactical sense for the Bolsheviks as a small group of revolutionaries
trying to overthrow the militarily superior Tsarist regime in Moscow. It evolved into the
Soviet concept of aktivnyye meropriyatiya or “active measures” and was “well integrated
into Soviet policy and state structure, not only the KGB.”140 The U.S. Information
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Agency elaborated on the different types of Soviet propaganda in a report to Congress in
1988. The agency outlined three gradations of propaganda:141
1.) Black propaganda which was disseminated by the KGB and composed of
disinformation and forgeries meant to support a disinformation operation’s
authenticity.142
2.) White propaganda which was disseminated by elements of the Soviet press
under the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee which generally maintained
accuracy but supported the themes developed by active measures operations and framed
their reports from a heavily pro-Soviet perspective.143
3.) Gray propaganda which was disseminated by the International Department
(ID) of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, local communist groups, Sovietbacked international front groups, workers organizations and foreign-policy related
academic institutions and contained both elements of truth and disinformation.144
Further evidence supporting the centrality and importance of active measures operations
in the Soviet security apparatus come from the long-standing head of the active measures
operations for the East German Stasi, Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth. The Colonel practically
echoed Lenin’s words, when he reportedly said “A powerful adversary can only be
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defeated through ... sophisticated, methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even
the smallest ‘cracks’ between our enemies ... and within their elites.”145
During the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community worked fastidiously to
identify and counter Soviet active measures operations. In an FBI report to the House of
Representatives in 1981, only declassified by the CIA in 2006, the agency outlines the
different types of known active measures operations at the time, which include: efforts to
manipulate the press in foreign countries, disinformation operations, political influence
operations, forgery operations, and efforts to influence local groups such as arms control
and disarmament movements, labor organizations, trade unions, religious
organizations.146147
According to an FBI report declassified in 2013, Soviet forgery operations were
conducted with several goals in mind. They served to promote Soviet foreign policy
goals, influence political action and public opinion in the U.S. and abroad and discredit
the U.S. and its allies.148 These forgery operations typically targeted elected officials and
the heads of government agencies from NATO-member countries. The falsified
documents would then be widely circulated through cooperative pro-Soviet media outlets
as well as unwitting international media outlets. Most frequently, the forgeries were
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designed to supply ‘factual evidence’ for Moscow’s disinformation campaigns which had
already been advanced by other active measure operations and propaganda.149 One
example of alleged Soviet forgery came in the form of a letter sent anonymously to the
Washington Post and U.S. New and World Report in 1986.150 The purported forgery was
authored by the United States Information Agency (USIA) official Herbert Romerstein to
Senator David Durenberger, the former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.151 The letter callously suggests that the USIA would inflate the reported
number of Chernobyl victims in an effort to further discredit the USSR over the
incident.152 The letter, having its intended effect, created an immediate public outcry
from the European NATO-members even though it was immediately and thoroughly
denied by all involved parties.
In 1987, the FBI described political influence operations as one of the most
increasingly common and sophisticated active measure programs utilized by the Soviet
Union’s security apparatus.153 Soviet agents would secure the assistance, often
unwittingly, of European and U.S. citizens who held similar foreign policy goals on
specific issues as the Soviet Union.154 By misrepresenting themselves as religious
leaders, trade representatives, journalists, UN officials or diplomats, the Soviet agents
would both help establish and provide material aid for groups which held foreign policy
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positions favored by Moscow.155 These operations also varied in size. In some instances,
Soviet operatives would target political figures in a foreign country by playing to their
ego, offering meetings with high-level Soviet leaders, then exploiting the connection by
disseminating a mixture of distorted truths and falsified information which was designed
to advance Soviet foreign policy goals or by blackmailing the target to extract
information.156157 While in other instances, a political influence operation was directed at
the broader public through influencing prominent journalists.158 In one such case, a
prominent French journalist, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a prolific writer and an influential
voice in French political circles, was under Soviet patronage for over twenty years before
the influence operation was detected by French intelligence agencies and Pathe was
arrested.159
As established in previous chapters, technological adaptation, specifically the
integration of cyber operations within intelligence agencies, has led to an unprecedented
amplification of political influence operations by taking full advantage of the reach
provided by online social media. In bypassing the journalist who once stood as the
gatekeepers to the wider public, these operations were able to craft their messaging more
precisely, reach a significantly larger portion of the population and disseminate
disinformation with significantly greater frequency. Today’s influence operations employ

155

U.S. Cong. House. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Soviet Active Measures in the United States - An
Updated Report by the FBI. C.W. Bill Young, 9 December 1987. 100 th Cong. 1st sess. Central Intelligence
Agency, Declassified, 13 September 2013. www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP11M01338R000400470089-2.pdf.
156
Ibid.
157
Kux, Dennis. “Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: Overview and Assessment.” Journal of the
US Army War College, 1 January 1985. www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp9100901r000600200001-2.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.

53

a number of different methods which have amplified their messages. Popular social
media outlets like Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Google, Twitter and YouTube have all
reported evidence of Russian troll farm activities on their platforms.160 In a statement to
the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Facebook’s Vice President and
General Counsel Colin Stretch claimed “foreign actors, hiding behind fake accounts,
abused our platform and other internet services to try to sow division and discord—and to
try to undermine our election process—is an assault on democracy.”161 In his testimony,
Stretch indicated that Russian trolls misrepresenting themselves as U.S. citizens created
and shared posts, paid to advertise and promote their specific pages, and paid for specific
advertisements to be seen in other user’s News Feeds.162 While at another secession of
the same committee, the Acting General Counsel for Twitter, Sean Edgett, indicated that
similar activates were also occurring on Twitter’s platform.163 During the testimony,
Edgett also elaborated on the use of Russian disinformation, fake accounts and social bots
on Twitter, all of which were used to amplify their divisive messages.164
Russia’s continued strategic use of active measures against rivals and its
increasing use of cyber operations is not only supported by evidence provided by the
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intelligence services countering Russia’s aggression. In fact, these disruptive and covert
methods were written into the Russian National Security Strategy, a presidential edict
issued by Vladimir Putin in December, 2015. In the security strategy document, Russia’s
vision of its resurgent position and disruptive role in the international system becomes
apparent even while invoking language which promotes global cooperation and
sustainable development. When addressing Russia’s role in the modern world, the
security strategy emphasizes enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world, protecting
the rights of compatriots abroad and maintaining and strengthening its economic potential
in the face of restrictive economic measures introduced by other countries.165 While
written with conciliatory language, some of these aims are quite clear. Enhancing
Russia’s role in a polycentric, or multipolared world, requires the degradation of the US
and its allies which according to the security strategy “are seeking to retain their
dominance in world affairs.”166 Protecting the rights of compatriots abroad may sound
benevolent, yet recent history in Georgia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine demonstrate that
the desire to protect ethnic Russians can be used as a justification for military
intervention within neighboring countries. Strengthening Russia’s economy in the face of
economic restrictions, while unconfrontational in tone, also indicates Russia’s continued
defiance against the economic sanctions imposed over its annexation of Crimea in 2014.
These three clauses, read together, point to ongoing confrontation on the global stage as
Russia continues to defy international law in the face of sanctions, remains a military
threat to its neighbors and attempts to undermine the existing international order.
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The security strategy document specifies a number of Russian national defense
priorities, however these defensive concerns mirror Russia’s own tactics in their efforts
abroad. While allegedly addressing a security concern, one particular section regarding
informational and communication technologies reads more like a succinct description of
Russia’s own strategy. It states, “The intensifying confrontation in the global information
arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication
technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public
awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the
international situation.” Similarly, the document points out potential security risks
associated with the use of financial and business ties as well as energy policy as a means
of political manipulation, all of which, are tactics Russia has been accused of using
itself.167168 While the document does temper its language at certain points, it openly calls
into question the viability of the Euro-Atlantic regional security system based on the
collective defense of NATO and the European Union.169 When read in context with
Russia’s recent maneuvers on the global stage, it becomes clear that this is the security
doctrine of a nation with revisionist global ambitions.
As it’s national security strategy provides a broader overview of Russia’s
geopolitical objectives, the Doctrine of Informational Security of the Russian Federation
signed by Vladimir Putin on December 5th, 2016, offers more specific detail as to the
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purpose of Russian cyber operations. In a manner similar to the security strategy, it
outlines informational security threats that are brazenly similar to the cyber operations
Moscow itself has been accused of utilizing. One section warns that “extremist
organizations widely use information tools to influence individual, group and public
consciousness in order to fester interethnic and social tensions, incite ethnic or religious
hatred or hostility, [and] spread extremist ideology” which sounds extremely similar to
the cyber operations allegedly undertaken by the GRU’s hybrid troll and social bots.170 In
a section related to information security and public security, Russian authorities warn of
the “use of information technologies to promote extremist ideology, spread xenophobia
and ideas of national exceptionalism for the purposes of undermining the [state’s]
sovereignty, [as well as] political and social stability.”171 Here lies a crucial insight,
Moscow believes the use of informational technologies, i.e. cyber operations, can
promote extremist ideology which in turn undermines political and social stability and
ultimately a state’s sovereignty.
When one considers Russia’s historical reliance on active measures to counter
rival conventional military strength, its open disdain for Euro-Atlantic regional security
as provided by NATO and the European Union is clear. Russia’s promotion of corrosive
extremist ideologies, political influence and disinformation via cyber operations paints a
broader picture. The purpose behind these cyber operations is to amplify Russian efforts
to undermine the social and political cohesion between the members of the European
Union and NATO as well as between different groups within the member countries. Once
170
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again, we recall Lenin, who in 1920 wrote, “the whole point lies in knowing how to apply
these tactics”172 An equally important point, however is that Russian cyber operations
should not be considered in isolation. They have become one of Russia’s most potent
active measures, yet these active measures all work in tandem to advance Russia’s
geopolitical objectives as a revisionist power.
To further support this claim, it is worthwhile to examine the political parties
which have been most critical of the European Union and NATO while also holding a
more conciliatory position towards Russia. In a report, the Economist tallied the
European political parties in which members were known to have personal and business
ties with Russia’s political elite and oligarchs and also were supportive of relations with
Russia. The parties included: Attack of Bulgaria, Golden Dawn and Syriza of Greece,
Jobbik of Hungary, the Freedom Party of Austria, the National Front of France, the
British National Party and the UK Independence Party of the United Kingdom, Podemos
of Spain, the Northern League and Forza Italia of Italy, National Democratic Party and
Alternative for Deutschland of Germany and Vlaams Belang of Belgium.173 While the
U.S. Republican Party was not included in this list, President Trump has been
unprecedently critical of NATO174, cheered the U.K.’s referendum to leave the European

Lenin, Vladimir. ‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Executive Committee of the
Communist International, Moscow: 1920, pp. 72 - 74.
173
“In the Kremlin's Pocket.” The Economist, London: 12 February 2015.
www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket.
174
Gordon, Michael R., and Niraj Chokshi. “Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for 'Good Deals' With
Russia.” New York Times, 15 January 2017. www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/europe/donald-trumpnato.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=5078084B3184C81AA427583DE45D8926&gwt=pay.
172

58

Union175 and has been uniquely open to enhanced cooperation with Russia176 all while
under the shadow of special prosecutor Robert Mueller’s investigation into potential ties
to Russia. Admittedly, it is impossible to determine whether politicians from these parties
have been the target of political influence operations or if they genuinely held
conciliatory views towards Russian foreign policy. However, such personal and business
ties are strikingly similar to the connections used by Soviet agents when they ran political
influence operations in the past. If any of these politicians are the targets of Russian
influence operations it also supports the argument that Russia is using all the active
measures in their intelligence services’ repertoire to advance their geopolitical objectives.
The claims made here are expansive. Through evaluating the body of research for
this thesis, it has become clear that Russian intelligence services, experts in the use of
covert active measures to advance the Russian state’s geopolitical objectives, have
effectively adopted cyber operations. Russian intelligence services have used cyber
operations to both enhance the viability of their political influence and disinformation
activities. By using cyber operations in tandem with other active measures, Russia was
able to interfere in the democratic elections of states with a particular focus on those
within the transatlantic community. This disruption was meant to impact the social and
political stability of these Western societies, promote those who held sympathetic views
of Russia and undermine the regional security as provided by NATO and the European
Union. Crucially, this assessment is shared by many who are considered knowledgeable
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on the matter. On March 8th, 2018, the commander of U.S. European Command and
NATO’s supreme allied commander, Cutis M. Scaparrotti addressed the Senate Armed
Services Committee. In his testimony, Commander Scaparrotti claimed:
Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO, and
undermine U.S. leadership in order to protect its regime, re-assert
dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence around the
globe. To achieve these ends, the Kremlin is prepared to employ the full
spectrum of Russia’s power, … Additionally, Russia aggressively uses
social media and other means of mass communication to push
disinformation, test the resolve of the United States, and erode our
credibility with European partners. … Russia is advancing its indirect and
asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its concept of warfare, which
envisions the coordinated use of military and non-military elements of
national power to shape the strategic environment. Throughout Europe,
Russia exercises malign influence to disrupt and attempt to fracture
NATO, undermine trans-Atlantic cohesion, and erode democratic
foundations. Russia interferes in the electoral process across numerous
states, including supporting a plan to violently disrupt elections in
Montenegro, the newest member of NATO. Russia works to influence the
geopolitical environment through the use of key acquisitions, proxies, and
other agents of influence. Using indirect action, particularly against
countries along its periphery, Russia seeks to use information operations
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and cyberspace operations to manipulate and influence the information
domain and to shape a narrative of its choosing.177
As evidence collected by the transatlantic communities’ intelligence services on Russian
cyber and political influence operations continues to accumulate and experts like
Supreme Commander Scaparrotti share their assessments on Russian cyber operations,
the purpose behind Russia’s cyber operations become increasingly irrefutable.
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Chapter Six: Quantifying the Effects
This chapter focuses on available public data, primarily in the form of
international polling and survey data, to answer the question first posed in Chapter One,
“What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated
cyber operations?” Here I compare the quantitative data collected from “consolidated
democracies”178 which were targeted by cyber operations directed against elections
described in a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report179 with the data collected
for a control group of consolidated democracies which have not experienced similar
cyber operations in order to assess the effects of cyber acts.
The data primarily used in the quantitative analysis was collected by Gallup
World Poll which conducts annual phone and in-person interviews in over 160 countries
with an average of 1,000 participants to track national perceptions on both domestic and
international issues.180 I selected the polling questions, “In this country, do you have
confidence in the national government?” and “In this country, do you have confidence in
the honesty of elections?” to serve as indicators of the potential effects of cyber
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operations. These particular questions were selected because if the objective behind cyber
operations was to increase hyper-partisanship and erode the legitimacy of democraticallyelected leaders then changes in the populations’ response to these questions could
demonstrate the effect of the operations.
The consolidated democracies which endured the most prolific cyber operations
directed at their elections as described again in the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations report were the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. 181 The United States
has also been added to this test group since it has similarly been targeted by cyber
operations as established in other various Senate reports.182 The control group, composed
of consolidated democracies in which there is scant evidence of cyber operations against
their elections, includes Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg. By
comparing the data between the test group and control group, it will be possible to
observe emerging trends within the data. Polling data gathered from 2008 was chosen as
a base year for comparison purposes because none of the countries which endured cyber
operations against their elections had yet to report evidence of active cyber operations.
Likewise, polling data collected from 2016 was chosen for comparison against the base
year because, as noted in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report and Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report, all of the countries in the test group alleged
active cyber operations targeting their elections during the given year.
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The control group, Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg, were
selected because they all fall within the criteria of consolidated democracies and little to
no evidence of active cyber operations against their national elections has yet to emerge.
By taking the individual country’s responses to the polling questions and calculating the
control group’s mean number for each potential response, ‘confidence,’ ‘no confidence’
and ‘unsure confidence,’ an average response for the control group is established. In
2008, when asked “In this country, do you have confidence in the national government?”,
the control group’s mean numbers showed 50.4% of respondents expressed ‘confidence’
in the national government, 43% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence’ in the national
government and 6.4% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence’ in the national
government. The control group’s mean numbers for the second question, “In this country,
do you have confidence in the honesty of elections?” in the same given year indicated
72.2% of respondents expressing ‘confidence’ in the honesty of elections, 22.6% of
respondents expressing ‘no confidence’ in the honesty of elections and 5.4% of
respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence’ in the honesty of elections. Against these
base numbers we will compare the mean numbers for the control group eight years later.
The control group’s mean number, or average responses to the survey questions,
showed little change from the findings of 2008 responses and what was found in the 2016
responses. For the question regarding confidence in national government 56.6% of
respondents expressed ‘confidence,’ 39.8% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence,’
and 3.4% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence.’ For the question on confidence
in the honesty of elections, there were also only small changes with 71.8% of respondents
expressing ‘confidence,’ 25.8% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence,’ and 2.2% of

64

respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence.’ That represents an average increase in the
control group’s confidence in their respective national governments by 6.2% and an
average decrease in the control group’s lack of confidence by 3.2%. The change in the
control group’s confidence in the honesty of elections was negligible at -.4% of
respondents while those who lack confidence rose just 3.2%. All together the changes
seen between 2008 and 2016 in the control group’s confidence in their national
governments and the honesty of their elections were moderately small.
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The polling data from the control group of consolidated democracies is displayed
here:183184
Country/Year

Control Group

Confidence

No Confidence

Unsure Confidence

Ireland
2008

Confidence in National Government

51%

47%

1%

2016

Confidence in National Government

57%

38%

4%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

70%

28%

2%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

71%

26%

2%

2008

Confidence in National Government

26%

66%

8%

2016

Confidence in National Government

61%

36%

3%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

84%

13%

4%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

87%

12%

1%

2008

Confidence in National Government

59%

39%

2%

2016

Confidence in National Government

62%

38%

0%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

67%

31%

2%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

69%

30%

1%

2008

Confidence in National Government

34%

49%

17%

2016

Confidence in National Government

35%

57%

8%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

61%

25%

14%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

56%

40%

4%

2008

Confidence in National Government

82%

14%

4%

2016

Confidence in National Government

68%

30%

2%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

79%

16%

5%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

76%

21%

3%

Iceland

Canada

Portugal

Luxembourg
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The test group of consolidated democracies saw a more dramatic change over the
same timeframe. After collecting the individual country’s responses to the polling
questions and calculating the test group’s mean numbers for each potential response,
‘confidence,’ ‘no confidence’ and ‘unsure confidence,’ we can draw comparisons
between the test group’s 2008 and 2016 responses. In 2008, when asked “In this country,
do you have confidence in the national government?”, the test group’s mean numbers
showed 44.8% of respondents expressed ‘confidence’ in the national government, 49% of
respondents expressed ‘no confidence’ in the national government and 6.8% of
respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence’ in the national government. The mean
numbers for the second question, “In this country, do you have confidence in the honesty
of elections?” in the same year, showed 59.8% of respondents expressing ‘confidence’ in
the honesty of elections, 36% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence’ in the honesty of
elections and 4.6% of respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence’ in the honesty of
elections. Against these base numbers we can compare the mean numbers for the test
group’s data from eight years later.
The test group’s mean numbers had changed more substantially in the 2016
responses. For the question regarding confidence in national government 38.8% of
respondents expressed ‘confidence,’ 59.8% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence,’
and 1.2% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence.’ For the question focused on
confidence in the honesty of elections, there were noticeable changes as well with 52.4%
of respondents expressing ‘confidence,’ 46% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence,’
and 1.4% of respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence.’ That represents an average
decrease in the test group’s confidence in their national governments by 6% and an
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average increase in the test group’s lack of confidence in their national governments by
10.8%. The change in the test group’s confidence in the honesty of elections was also
more dramatic, decreasing by 7.4% while those who lack confidence rose by 10%. Taken
together the changes seen between 2008 and 2016 in the test group’s confidence in their
national governments and the honesty of their elections was fairly significant.
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The polling data from the test group of consolidated democracies is displayed
here:185186
Country/Year

Test Group

Confidence

No Confidence

Unsure Confidence

United States
2008

Confidence in National Government

38%

62%

1%

2016

Confidence in National Government

30%

69%

1%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

47%

53%

0%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

30%

69%

1%

2008

Confidence in National Government

36%

49%

15%

2016

Confidence in National Government

24%

75%

1%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

52%

35%

14%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

35%

63%

1%

2008

Confidence in National Government

43%

51%

6%

2016

Confidence in National Government

55%

43%

2%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

49%

47%

4%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

71%

27%

2%

2008

Confidence in National Government

45%

49%

6%

2016

Confidence in National Government

28%

70%

1%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

66%

31%

4%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

52%

46%

2%

2008

Confidence in National Government

62%

34%

6%

2016

Confidence in National Government

57%

42%

1%

2008

Confidence in Honesty of Election

85%

14%

1%

2016

Confidence in Honesty of Election

74%

25%

1%

Italy

Germany

France

The Netherlands

It’s important to establish that it would be unwise to draw any direct correlations
between this analysis of changing perspectives of national governments and honesty in
elections and Russian cyber operations against elections. While there are too many
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country-specific political caveats to establish a correlation, the analysis does show trends
that support the argument that cyber operations are having an effect on elections.
Findings from the control group appear to indicate a growing confidence in the
respondents’ national governments and a small decline in those who lacked of confidence
in them. Simultaneously, the control group saw only a slight decrease in their confidence
in the honesty of their elections and a small increase in the number of respondents
expressing a lack of confidence.
Control Group - Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg
Confidence in National Government
Confidence in Honesty of Election
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
Confidence
No Confidence
Unsure Confidence
2008
50.40%
43%
6.40%
72.20%
22.60%
5.40%
2016
56.60%
39.80%
3.40%
71.80%
25.80%
2.20%
% Change
6.20%
-3.20%
-3%
-0.40%
3.20%
-3.20%
Test Group - United States, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
2008
44.80%
49%
6.80%
59.80%
36%
4.60%
2016
38.80%
59.80%
1.20%
52.40%
46%
1.40%
% Change
-6%
10.80%
-5.60%
-7.40%
10%
-3.20%
187188

By comparison, the test group’s confidence in national elections actually declined
a moderate amount while those with a lack of confidence in the national government
increases substantially. Most significant was the decline in the test groups confidence in
elections and their increase in respondents with no confidence in the honestly of
elections, both of which saw substantial increases. The trend in this data is clear, between
2008 and 2016 the control group saw slight increase in its confidence in national
governments while its confidence in the honesty of elections declined only marginally.
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As for the test group, it saw both moderate decreases in its confidence in national
governments and its confidence in the honesty of elections. The test group’s trends
between 2008 and 2016 are straightforward and support (but cannot definitively be
proven) the argument that cyber operations are having a disruptive or influential effect on
the electoral process in democratic states.
The trends indicated from the analysis are more alarming when considered in a
broader context. A global survey which collected data from respondents in 38 countries
conducted in 2017 by Pew Research Center found that only 23% of respondents were
fully committed to representative democracy. 189 Shockingly, a plurality of respondents at
47%, showed less commitment to representative democracy while indicating an openness
to other forms of governance. Alarmingly, 13% of respondents indicated a commitment
to nondemocratic forms of governance. 190 While it is impossible to test the control group
against this data set as they were not all represented in the survey, we can find the mean
response from our test group. Compared to the global median, the test group’s average
response does not seem quite as shocking, it does indicate an alarming openness to
alternative forms of governance.191 This openness to alternative forms of governance is
only made more of a concern by the declining confidence in national governments and
honesty of elections trend established for the test group earlier.
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Commitment to Representative
Democracy192
Committed Less Committed Nondemocratic
40%
46%
7%
47%
37%
8%
37%
42%
9%
36%
47%
10%
35%
45%
10%
39%
43%
9%

United States
The Netherlands
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Test Group's Average

As disconcerting as these emerging trends are, it is also important to contextualize
the results along with other quantitative findings. These indicate that the health of
democracy and the electoral process remain robust. The Economist Intelligence Unit has
constructed a democratic index for over 165 states, collecting data on various quantitative
factors with which they calculate a measurement of democracy’s health in a nation since
2006. “The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism;
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political
culture.”193 When the test group and control group are tested against the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s findings it helps to temper the earlier findings regarding declining
confidence in national governments and honesty in elections. This can be seen by
comparing the control group and the test group’s annual scores on the democratic index
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which indicate few discrepancies between the two groups and show little volatility since
the measurement was first taken in 2006.

Test Group's Democratic Index Score:
Year United States
Italy
2006
8.22
2007
*
2008
8.22
2009
*
2010
8.18
2011
8.11
2012
8.11
2013
8.11
2014
8.11
2015
8.05
2016
7.98
2017
7.98

France
United Kingdom Netherlands Test Group's Average
7.73
8.07
8.08
9.66
*
*
*
*
7.98
8.07
8.15
9.53
*
*
*
*
7.83
7.77
8.16
8.99
7.74
7.77
8.16
8.99
7.74
7.88
8.21
8.99
7.85
7.92
8.31
8.84
7.85
8.04
8.31
8.92
7.98
7.92
8.31
8.92
7.98
7.92
8.36
8.8
7.98
7.8
8.53
8.89

8.352
*
8.39
*
8.186
8.154
8.186
8.206
8.246
8.236
8.208
8.236
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Control Group's Democratic Index Score:
Year Iceland
Ireland Canada Luxembourg
Portugal
Control Group's Average
2006
9.71
9.01
9.07
9.1
8.16
9.01
2007
*
*
*
*
*
*
2008
9.65
9.01
9.07
9.1
8.05
8.976
2009
*
*
*
*
*
*
2010
9.65
8.79
9.08
8.88
8.02
8.884
2011
9.65
8.56
9.08
8.88
7.81
8.796
2012
9.65
8.56
9.08
8.88
7.92
8.818
2013
9.65
8.68
9.08
8.88
7.65
8.788
2014
9.58
8.72
9.08
8.88
7.79
8.81
2015
9.58
8.85
9.08
8.88
7.79
8.836
2016
9.5
9.15
9.15
8.81
7.86
8.894
2017
9.58
9.15
9.15
8.81
7.84
8.906
195
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Viewing the data comprehensively, there are a few findings that stand out most
clearly. Compared against the control group, the test group of consolidated democracies
displayed declining confidence in both their national governments and the honesty of
their elections. While one cannot directly assert a correlation between Russia’s use of
cyber operations against elections and these findings they do establish an alarming trend.
Furthermore, a plurality of respondents from our test group are, at least in surveys, open
to other forms of governance besides representative democracy while a sizable minority
are even open to nondemocratic forms of governance. This aspect is crucial as it indicates
if the trends of decreasing confidence in national governments and honesty of elections
are not reversed, there are significant portions of society within the test group countries
that would be open to alternative forms of governance. As disturbing as these trends
appear, by other measures democratic and electoral health remain strong. Considering the
implications that both the test and control groups have maintained strong scores on the
democratic index for over a decade, the health of the democratic and electoral institutions
does not seem to be a concern. Rather, the findings are indicative of the electorate which
is made up of people and if people increasingly perceive these institutions with
diminished confidence it could undermine the system as a whole.
See Annex A for graphic representation of each individual country’s annual
confidence in their national government and confidence in the honesty of their elections.
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Chapter Seven: Russia’s International Meddling and Active Measures – An
Interview with a Former Eastern European Official
This study has established in previous chapters that cyber operations are just one
type of active measure Russia has employed to accomplish its strategic goal of countering
and degrading the Euro-Atlantic regional security framework provided by the European
Union and NATO. These efforts are ongoing and multipronged. While government
officials and the media in Western Europe and North America are only starting to become
aware of these Russian objectives, many in Eastern Europe have experienced first-hand
what Russian active measures can accomplish when not sufficiently confronted. This
chapter offers insight into Russian active measures witnessed and experienced by a
former government official from Moldova. The former official, Vladimir Lupan, has held
numerous high-level government positions in which he has witnessed with rising alarm
Russia’s growing influence and the corrosive effects of its active measures on regional
domestic politics.
In order to appreciate Mr. Lupan’s account, we must first contextualize
Moldova geographically, historically and geopolitically. Given Moldova’s relatively low
international profile, its place on the map remains obscure to many. Moldova, a former
Soviet republic, is an Eastern European country wedged between northeastern Romania
and southwestern Ukraine which gained its independent in 1991. Its capital, Chișinău,
lies in between the two rivers which dominate the country. To the west, the Prut River
serves as a border with Romania, while to the east the Dniestr River and adjacent lands
border Ukraine. Circumstances in the east are complicated by what many Moldovans
have seen as evidence of Russia’s continued international meddling in the country. Trans75

Dniestr or Transnistria, a strip of land between Ukraine and the Dniestr River which
ranges from two to 25 miles wide, is the home of a Russian-supported secessionist
movement and has been a source of tension even preceding Moldova’s independence.
The roots of the division can be traced to the Soviet Union’s earliest expansionist
policies. When Soviet authorities first decided to create the Moldavian Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR) on March 7th, 1924, it was composed of the
Transnistria region and portions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian
SSR) and, though autonomous, fell under the administration of the Ukrainian SSR.196
Historians suspect the Moldavian ASSR (MASSR) was created by the Soviets to serve
the duel purposes of bolstering Soviet claims to Bessarabia, an eastern territory of the
Kingdom of Romania which bordered the newly-created MASSR, and exporting the
Soviet’s ideology to Romania and the wider Balkans region.197 In pursuit of these goals,
the Soviets directed both industrialization and Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian
immigration to the region.198 In 1939, as a stipulation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
Nazi Germany recognized Soviet sovereignty in Bessarabia which led to Romania
relinquishing the territory and its incorporation into the newly-formed Moldavian Soviet
Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR) in 1940.199 During WWII, with German military
assistance the Romanians gained control of the Moldavian SSR briefly but it was
recaptured by the Soviets in 1944.200 For clarity, Bessarabia, formerly part of the
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Kingdom of Romanian, comprises the western portion of modern day Moldova together
with Transnistria to east.
In the aftermath of the war, the Moldavian SSR was reinstated. Soviet
immigration and development patterns established before the war, strengthened by Soviet
suspicion of ethnic Moldavians’ loyalty to the USSR, led to a reemergence of
industrialization policy which was preferential to Transnistria at the expense of the rest of
the Moldavian SSR.201 These patterns were self-perpetuating as a lack of development
led to resentment among the ethnic Moldavians in the west and as job opportunities drew
ethnic Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians to Transnistria which in turn spurred greater
investment in the territory.202 As the USSR was dissolving, these patterns had created
pronounced ethnic distinctions and immense disparities in industrial capacity between
Transnistria and the rest of Moldavia.203
These regional ethnic and industrial discrepancies within Moldovia, led to societal
cleavages that erupted into violence before the country had even declared independence
in 1991.204 By September, 1989, Tiraspol which served as Transnistria’s de facto capital,
was demanding protections for minority languages and to preserve the region’s political
clout.205 As the USSR demise appeared increasingly inevitable, many ethnic Russians,
Belarusians and Ukrainians in Transnistria took the preemptive step of declaring
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Transnistrian independence, establishing what they called the Pridnestrovian Moldavian
Republic, out of fear of Moldova’s potential reunification with Romania.206 This move
quickly led to conflict. Between November 1990 and July 1992, Transnistrian separatists,
with alleged support from the Russian 14th Army regiment stationed within the region,
fought the newly-formed Moldavian military forces to a cease fire.207 In the aftermath of
the conflict, Russia maintained a military presence in the region and offered its support
for Tiraspol both politically and economically.208
While support for Transnistria represents Russia’s most overt example of
interfering in Moldova’s domestic politics, in many ways, it served only as the entry
point for Russian covert efforts at interference within the country.209 Since Moldova
declared independence on August 27th, 1991, Moscow has used negotiations with the
breakaway region and the issue of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians as a way to
involve itself in Moldovan affairs.210 As established in the 1994 Constitution, the country
adopted a democratic, unicameral parliamentary republic and saw a democratic and
centrist agrarian party win a plurality of parliamentary seats in the country’s first election
held same year. These early years saw the country’s state-directed economy transition to
a market-based economy which caused economic pain and resulted in declining and
dismal GDP growth that continued until 1999.211 Economic headwinds as well as
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nostalgia for the relative calm of the Soviet era provided potent campaign issues and
secured an electoral plurality for the Party of Communists in the 1998 election.212 The
remaining vote was divided between three pro-democratic parties, all of which were
advocating greater integration with Western Europe, while the agrarian party which held
power was stripped of all representation.213 The Party of Communists, difficult to place
on a traditional ideological spectrum, held deeply conservative social views and
advocated for greater ties with Russia, while nominally promoting a left-leaning
economic platform.214 A similar pattern continues to the modern day, with the
government switching hands between a communist party in support of greater ties to
Russia and a coalition of liberal and centrist parties in support of greater ties to the
European Union.215 Those who support greater integration with the EU, would argue that
whenever they made significant steps towards their goal, Russian domestic interference
became more pronounced.216
While this summation could not possibly capture all the subtleties of Moldovan
domestic politics or its historic relations with Russia or Western Europe, it should
provide enough background to contextualize the proceeding interview with Vladimir
Lupan. Mr. Lupan has had a distinguished career, serving as a member of the Moldovan
Parliament, during which time he served on the Committee on National Security, Defense
and Public Order and as an alternate member on its Committee on Foreign Affairs and
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European Integration.217 In addition, Mr. Lupan has served as Foreign Policy Adviser to
the Acting President of the Republic of Moldova and held numerous diplomatic posts
including Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the
United Nations, Head of Political-Military Cooperation with the NATO and a member of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Croatia.218
Over the course of his career, he has advocated for greater cooperation between Moldova
and the European Union, opposed increasing ties to the Russian Federation and loudly
objected to Russia’s incursion within Moldovan politics. In expressing these positions,
Mr. Lupan has himself become the target of a disinformation operation. He now resides
in New York, working as an independent expert in international affairs, where he was
gracious enough to share his thoughts on Russia’s international meddling and active
measures. As the interview was extensive, in order to ensure clarity and concision
portions specifically relevant to Russian cyber operations and active measures are
presented here. The interview in its entirety can be found in Annex B.

Interviewer: How would you describe relations between Russia
and Moldova since Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the
European Union in 2014? Can you elaborate on any role Russia may have
in Moldova’s domestic politics with regards to the breakaway region of
Transnistria?
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Vladimir: In 1998, there was even a partnership agreement with
the EU and we began negotiating the partnership agreement in 1994 and it
was agreed to in 1998. In 1999-2000 there was an agreement to upgrade
the partnership. Moldova only became independent in 1991 and started
negotiating with the EU in 1994 so it was only three years. Moldova has a
history of moving towards the EU, practically from its independence but
Russia showed its true face with the Kozak Memorandum. What was the
purpose of this exclusive veto power for the separatists? It is to give them
autonomy and Russia has influence over this faction. It’s is purely an
attempt to grant them leverage over Moldova. They would have the power
in the decision process, we called this the Transnistria-ization of Moldova.
Later, you also saw the Transnistria-ization of Ukraine and the
developments were essentially the same. This process involves
federalization which sounds good but the plan was written by Russia in
such a manner to give a small actor veto power over the larger actor be it
Moldova or Ukraine while Russia maintains influence over that small
minority. You can even see these same tactics being applied in the United
States, it’s a different matter but during the 2016 elections there were
numerous succession groups in the United States that were supported by
Russia. In this way Moldova is a testing ground. However, in 2013, in
Moldova you saw a backlash both internally and externally which caused
the Party of Communists to reject the Kozak Memorandum and Russia
responded harshly with the embargo of wines and manipulation of energy,
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in the form of gas, prices. It was a form of punishment. You could see
Germany paying less for gas than Moldova even though it is farther from
Russia. The EU does not act with a single voice so it’s much easier to
attempt to divide and conquer the member states. It’s worth remembering
that Vladimir Putin was the head of the KGB an organization that had
worked on dividing and conquering Europe for years.

Interviewer: You’ve called Moldova a testing ground for Russian
political interference on Twitter and in response to the Russian
disinformation campaigns in July, 2017, the Moldovan Parliament finally
adopted an Anti-Propaganda Law. Can you explain what prompted the
law, how it was justified and received domestically and if you believe it’s
proving effective?
Vladimir: When I say Moldova is a “testing ground” you have to
understand that I’m referring to the use of proxies, and by proxy, I mean a
military that will do the dirty work without wearing your insignia. This
concept is equally applicable in all Russia’s efforts and not necessarily
only military. Try to be more flexible in your thinking. Whatever means
Russia can find in a country to use it against that country, if it is a political
party or a paramilitary, if it’s a struggling population longing for some
specific relation or benefits from Russia then they will become a
paramilitary, if there is a hacker who is interested in making the
government pay a price, for example Edward Snowden and the U.S., then
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they will use that against the country. They will use Wikileaks to release
documents or when possible, they will use their own “patriotic” hackers to
release any data when possible.

Interviewer: Pro-Russian media in Moldova have been spreading
news of the imminent restitution of historical land and property held by
Ukrainian citizens to Poland and likewise Moldovans having to return land
and property to Romania. According to these fake reports, the Association
Agreements that both Ukraine and Moldova signed with the European
Union in 2014 calls for such restitution. The Association Agreement calls
for nothing of this sort. What effects have such online “fake news” sources
had on Moldova and how can “fake news” propagated online be
neutralized?
Vladimir: It’s funny you mention this. These stories of Moldova
having to give territory back to Romania. Here in New York, I was sitting
with my Russian barber and he asked me about this very issue. He asked
me why Moldovans would accept giving up territory in order to join the
European Union. I asked him where he had heard this and he pointed to
his television. It was on Russia-1 [a state-sponsored, Russian language
channel carried internationally]. I told him it wasn’t the case which he had
trouble believing. This is occurring all the time and because there are few
channels here in Russian many Russians who live abroad see these types
of reports. They have an effect. There is disinformation but you should
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look up the concept of Whataboutism by the journalist Michael Bernard,
its similar to the tu quoque logical fallacy. It is a technique the Soviets
used where if someone says something critical, you change the topic to
something distracting and more preferable. Americans would object to a
specific Soviet human rights abuse and the Soviets would counter with
something like “What about racism in America?” Obviously, both aren’t
good but the objective of the person using Whataboutism was to change
the subject. How can “fake news” propagated online be neutralized? Well,
as we saw, this is difficult. There can be laws but as in Moldova you have
to see the details of those laws.

Interviewer: Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Federal Security Services
(FSB) are believed to have played a part in Russia’s interference in the
2016 US presidential election through online groups respectively known
as “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear” by penetrating the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) in 2015 and releasing stolen and compromising
information at a time when it would have the greatest political impact.
Have you seen any comparable efforts in past Moldovan elections or do
you suspect they could take place in next year’s parliamentary elections?
Vladimir: In Moldova, the tactics used by Russia are more brazen.
They can use tactics they wouldn’t dare to use in the United States. Rather
than covertly attempting to manipulate an election, they can afford to be
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overt in their support of a party or candidates. This is combined with
disinformation against candidates who stand up to Russia or promote
deeper integration with the European Union. In this was the situation is
different between Moldova and the United States.

Interviewer: Russia has a long record of targeting outspoken critics
in an attempt to delegitimize them in the public eye. Considering your
position and outspoken criticism of Russian propaganda campaigns, have
you had any experiences with cyber intrusion or attempts to compromise
your character that you would be willing to share?
Vladimir: This occurred when I was serving as the Ambassador &
Permanent Representative of Moldova to the United Nations over the
Russian involvement in Syria. There were Russian media reports claiming
I had proposed rescinding Russia’s veto authority on the United Nations
Security Council. This is impossible. There is absolutely nothing in the
UN Charter about removing a Security Council member’s right to a veto.
There is no mechanism for that, so it would be impossible. This was about
building pressure diplomatically. Similar circumstances happened to
others at the UN over Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. As you
know, Moldova is not on the Security Council and even if it was, there is
no way to take away a veto from a Security Council member. It fits a
pattern though, they take elements of truth, in this case, another diplomat
had proposed a resolution in which veto authority would be challenged on
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a one-time issue for countries that prevented serious inquires on war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide and shape it to their
purposes.

Interviewer: What are the long-term objectives of Russia’s cyber
aggression and propaganda campaigns?
Vladimir: The purpose of Russian ops is not only to deceive the
West but also to destroy the values of the West. They target our collective
values. They want to destroy the rule of law in these countries. They want
to undermine the EU and NATO. They do this by bashing relations
between countries with things like gas price manipulation and they do it
within countries by bashing certain political parties. It’s about freedom to
act. It’s about realpolitik, when certain national security issues are present,
Russia understands realpolitik well and they use the resources available.
Essentially, Russia sees the United States as a country that can prohibit
them, for external and internal reasons, from expanding. Therefore, any
attempt by an administration to try to stop Russian actions will actually
face some sort of response. In order to solve a problem, you need to have a
willing partner, that’s the bilateral part of negotiations, you need to agree
on a certain set of actions, up to now I have not seen Russia willing to
stop. What we’ve see is Russia trying to restore its status as a superpower,
which they are incapable of. They are a regional power but not a
superpower, they cannot do more than that.
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After discussing Russia’s efforts at internal interference in Moldovan politics and
its use of active measures, what became clear, was the fact that Russian active measures
are adaptable and different active measures are used to meet the needs of a given
situation and its context. Moscow may not need to use cyber interference in Moldova
because it can utilize leverage against individual politicians or even political parties.
While such tactics are too transparent to be used effectively in some Western European
countries and the United States, if they work within a specific context, Russia will not
hesitate.
In contemplating Russia’s use of active measures, there is two commonalities that
all the active measures seem to share. The first is their ability to erode a society’s
commitment to the rule of law. Be it promoting the distribution of knowingly stolen
emails to the electoral detriment of a political opponent or providing financial incentives
to politicians to support dubious geopolitical positions. It is in this slow erosion of a
country’s commitment to the rule of law, that active measures also find their second
commonality which is the promotion of Russia’s long-term geopolitical objectives. This
is because at the center of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions is a desire to remove the model
of governance offered by nations in Western Europe and North America. Russia’s
governance is built on a system of corruption and patronage, it relies on a network of
oligarchs maintaining Vladimir Putin’s favor and it has no ideological underpinning. The
Russian regime seeks the dissolution of the European Union and the breakup of NATO as
long-term strategic goals because they stand as attractive alternatives to the Russian form
of governance.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations
In this thesis I have attempted to answer some basic questions about the use of
cyber operations as a means to disrupt, alter or influence state’s electoral processes. The
research involved in answering these questions unearthed some alarming insight into the
ways in which evolving technology has and likely will continue to be adopted by state
intelligence agencies. These new cyber operations have expanded the efficacy and scope
of intelligence agencies’ operations as well as presented the opportunity for innovative,
new, covert operations to be conceived and carried out. While limitations in available
data and geopolitical realities narrowed the scope of this research to a focus on, primarily,
Russian cyber operations directed at state’s electoral processes, there is ample evidence
to support the international community’s concern regarding Russia’s malign use of cyber
operations in general.
In the introduction to this thesis, I outlined several questions which aimed to
uncover the various aspects of cyber operations and their potential impact on electoral
processes. After examining the research and findings, it is worthwhile to reconsider those
questions:
•

What is the evidence that there have been verifiable attempts by states, statedirected actors, or non-state actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral
process in democratic states through coordinated cyber operations?
Over the course of the research, numerous documented cyber investigations have

emerged. These cyber investigations, conducted by independent experts and international
organizations as well as the U.S. intelligence community, have asserted with high levels
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of confidence that Russian state-sponsored actors have been involved in various attempts
to disrupt, alter and influence state’s electoral processes.219220221222
•

What were the methods used by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through
coordinated cyber operations?
For clarity, the methods used to disrupt, alter and influence electoral processes

were organized into three types of cyber operations based on the primary target of the
operation. The designated targets for each type of those cyber operations were the voting
equipment and election infrastructure, the elected officials, political operatives and
political parties and the broader public. Evidence uncovered by the FBI’s Cyber Division
demonstrates the depth and scope of Russia’s cyber operations that penetrated U.S.
state’s voting registries and electoral boards.223 Independent cyber investigations led by
the industry’s leading firms SecureWorks and TrendMicro have traced the most notorious
examples of cyber operations against political campaigns, the Clinton and Macron
presidential campaigns, back to Russian IP addresses. Cyber operations conducted by
Russian state-sponsored actors against the public, primarily through social media
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platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, have been exposed by the independent media
and confirmed by various intelligence services as well as the corporate leadership within
the social media platforms.224225226227
These new types of cyber operations are an outgrowth of intelligence services
adapting to emerging technologies. Russian intelligence agencies have a long history of
leveraging any advantage and utilizing rival nation’s societal division to advance
Russia’s geopolitical goals. These technological advances made many existing active
measures, such as the dispersion of propaganda and disinformation, media manipulation,
malign political influence, deception, the funding of extremist and opposition groups,
spreading conspiracy theories and rumor, and espionage, immeasurably more effective.228
By complementing existing Russian intelligence agencies’ active measures with cyber
operations, these agencies were able to use active measures in innovative, while still
untested, new ways to target numerous state electoral processes at a relatively low risk
and cost.

Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 June 2015.
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html.
225
United Kingdom. House of Commons. Defence Committee. Russia: Implications for UK Defence and
Security. London: 28 June 2016.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/107/107.pdf.
226
U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Statement of Janis Sarts, Director of NATO
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Testimony. 1 November 2017. 115th Cong. 1st sess.
Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2017.
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sfr-jsarts-062817b.pdf.
227
U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Response to Committee Questions for the Record, Colin
Stretch General Counsel, Facebook. Testimony. 1 November 2017. 115th Cong. 1st sess. Washington DC:
Government Print Office, 2017.
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Facebook%20Response%20to%20Comm
ittee%20QFRs.pdf.
228
Sipher, John. “Russian Active Measures and the 2016 Election Hack.” The Cipher Brief, 20 December
2017. www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/russian-active-measures-2016-election-hack.
224

90

•

What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states
through coordinated cyber operations?
Unfortunately, the answer to any question posed regarding the effects of cyber

operations, or attempted cyber operations, on state electoral processes remains elusive
and intensely contentious. While this thesis has provided both quantitative and qualitative
data which point to the corrosive effects of cyber operations on state electoral processes,
it cannot conclusively determine the effects. That being established, the data collected is
somewhat persuasive in making the case that cyber operations are having a deleterious
effect on electoral processes.
By comparing “consolidated democracies”229 targeted by cyber operations against
the data collected for a control group which had not experienced similar cyber operations,
some alarming trends were uncovered. The test group of consolidated democracies
experiencing attacks saw an average decrease in the group’s confidence in their national
governments by 6% and an average increase in the group’s lack of confidence in their
national governments by 10.8% during a period when Russia intelligence services were
most active. Similarly, the group’s average confidence in the honesty of elections also
saw dramatic changes, decreasing by 7.4%, while those who lack confidence rose by 10%
over the same period. These trends only appeared more alarming when compared against
The countries in this chapter are defined as ‘‘consolidated democracies,’’ a term taken from the
Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis”, which ranks and measures the
progress toward or backsliding from democracy. The ranking is determined by an assessment of a country’s
national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic
governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. Countries receiving the consolidated
democracy classification are defined as ones that ‘‘embody the best policies and practices of liberal
democracy but may face challenges—often associated with corruption—that contribute to a slightly lower
score.’’ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis.”
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a control group of democracies which had not been targeted by extensive Russian cyber
operations nor seen similar negative trends in public sentiment over the same period. The
findings appear to suggest that in targeted consolidated democracies, Russian cyber
operations were in fact having a corrosive effect on the public’s confidence in both the
honesty of elections and their national governments.
While the polling data established aggregate international trends which are
noteworthy, the interview with former Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Moldova to the United Nations, Vladimir Lupan, provided a more nuanced
analysis of the long-term effects of unchecked Russian active measures and cyber
operations. By Mr. Lupan’s telling, Russian intelligence agencies are actively pursuing
the dissolution of the European Union and NATO and will use any and all methods that
prove effective. His account outlined the various ways in which the Russian state
attempts to coerce and manipulate smaller states through its energy and trade policy as
well as directly supporting candidates, parties and factions within a state’s domestic
politics. Mr. Lupan expressed grave concern over the lack of a unified, forceful response
to Russian interference in state’s domestic politics and its pronounced disinformation
campaigns. One of the key insights, however alarming, was Mr. Lupan’s assessment that
Russian intelligence services will never be satisfied, rather they will continue to interfere
in state’s domestic politics through cyber operations and any other means available until
confronted.
One question, not previously considered in this thesis, concerns what can be done
to mitigate the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated
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cyber operations. Fortunately, various governments currently combating these issues, in
coordination with cyber security firms and international organizations, have already
begun the work necessary to counter and expose Russian intelligence services ongoing
cyber operations. While the countermeasures that have been taken are a response to
Russian cyber operations, they offer solutions that may be applicable against cyber
operations more broadly.
The most widely emphasized guidance with regards to mitigating Russian
disinformation and “Fake News” more generally, has been to increase the public’s
awareness of the issue and its ability to think critically when considering sources of
information. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the Baltic and Scandinavian
nations which never saw the threat of Russian active measures completely disappear after
the fall of the Soviet Union. Sweden, for example, has plans to implement a nationwide
primary school programs to help students identify Russian propaganda.230 The program,
which is scheduled to begin in July 2018, aims to increase student’s digital competence
and increase their ability to differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources. 231 This
initiative was spurred on by national polling data which indicated that eight out of ten
Swedes believed disinformation was having an impact on their perceptions of basic
facts.232 Sweden is not alone in using the education system to bolster its resilience to the
spread of disinformation. Holland and Finland have also set strong examples to follow,
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while countries in southern Europe, like Italy, are experimenting with their own
programs.233234 As the issue has become more prevalent, educational initiatives are
gaining traction across Europe and the U.S. as NGOs and international advocates see
their potential to blunt the effects of disinformation.235236
Yet, systemic changes to national education systems are often slow processes
which may not help to mitigate the spread of disinformation in the near-term. Due to
these concerns, experts are also advocating for greater public awareness of the issue. Jed
Willard, Director of the Harvard University-based FDR Center for Global Engagement
offers very specific advice to craft a unified, national, public message which can serve as
an alternative to disinformation narrative.237 Where Russian disinformation frequently
employs negative and racialized messages meant to fray societal cohesion, Willard
advises promoting a positive narrative which has broad appeal across the national
political spectrum.238
Jed Willard, who has advised both the Swedish and Finnish governments on these
issues is wary of legislation which could restrict freedom of speech and could potentially
be against those attempting to mitigate Russian disinformation.239 Adam Berinsky, a
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Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) shared
this assessment, emphasizing that members of the media and government officials should
resist correcting Russian disinformation and instead highlight a positive national
narrative.240 While many of these public awareness campaigns are still in development,
there have been positive signs they are beginning to have an effect. For example, in
Lithuania, citizens have begun volunteering their time to establish cyber-monitoring
teams which have been identifying Russian-sponsored socialbots, content and Russian
trolls presenting themselves as Lithuanians. Light-heartedly considering the fact that they
battle Russian “Trolls” in cyberspace, they call themselves “Elves.”
Beyond building greater resistance to Russian disinformation campaigns, many
security experts across the Transatlantic community have been advocating greater
coordination in approach and information sharing among allies. In the wake of Russia’s
cyber operation on the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the European Commission’s
European Political Strategy Centre issued a report calling for the creation of a “European
Cyber Shield.”241 It envisioned a comprehensive cyber security defense strategy that
would cover all member states and emphasize the protection of crucial industries such as
communications, healthcare, security, energy, financial services, and IT services, as well
as democratic institutions.242 The report noted the current fractured state of the EU’s
cyber security and foresaw the need for greater international cooperation in the fields of
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both IT security and intelligence.243 Enhancing cyber security cooperation and
committing to the implementation of a EU-wide cyber security strategy should be among
Europe’s top priorities.
NATO appears to have learned the risks associated with Russia’s cyber operations
earlier than the EU, but it too must reevaluate its cyber security apparatus and make
greater efforts to build a comprehensive cyber defense that can protect all of its members.
Following a trivial dispute between Estonia and Russia in 2007, Estonia was hit with a
debilitating cyber-attack against governmental, financial and communications
infrastructure which was widely attributed to Russia.244 Following this clear provocation,
NATO issued its first Cyber Defense Policy in 2008.245 Yet, NATO remained largely
reactionary, only calling for a Cyber Defense Pledge, under which all members were to
make enhanced cyber resiliency a matter of priority, and sign the Technical Arrangement
of Cyber Defense with the EU in 2016. While NATO and the EU officials have made
joint declarations in which they have pledged greater cooperation on cyber security,
concrete action must happen faster if it is to counteract Russian growing cyber
operations. In addition to removing the institutional barriers to greater cyber cooperation,
the EU and NATO should support and learn from the proactive cyber defense models for
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combating Russian cyber operations that are being implemented in Scandinavia and the
Baltics.246
Unfortunately, considering the insight offered in a previous chapter from
Vladimir Lupan, simply fortifying the West’s cyber security infrastructure and its
public’s resistance to disinformation is unlikely to deter future Russian cyber operations.
With the material costs associated with conducting cyber operations low and relatively
few external disincentives placed on Russia for its operations, Russia continues to see
cyber operations as a cost-effective method to undermine Western institutions. Only
when the cost of Russia’s actions is considered greater than the potential benefits of its
cyber operations will it be convinced to stop. Considering this insight, policymakers
across the transatlantic community should turn to asymmetric forms of retaliation to
counter Russian cyber aggression.
There are numerous ways in which the transatlantic community could strike back
against Russian cyber operations which exclude traditional kinetic force. Perhaps the
most irritating to Vladimir Putin would be supporting democratic institutions and
processes within Russia itself. This could include offering funding to the few remaining
NGOs and independent media outlets still operating within Russia. It could not be done
covertly, as such actions would likely be perceived as interfering in the country’s
domestic politics, but rather overtly and in support of values enshrined in the Helsinki
Final Act to which Russia is a signatory. American and European intelligence services
should be recruited in this effort, to reveal verified corruption among Russia’s
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intelligence services and oligarchs. To this end, the intelligence services could work to
expose any corruption associated with energy or trade policy as well as alleged Russian
assassination attempts, malign influence strategies and disinformation campaigns. Again,
these efforts would need to be overt and verifiable as to not be perceived as an attempt at
internal meddling in another country’s domestic politics.
Thanks to U.S. and European dominance in the international financial sector, the
transatlantic community has one very large asymmetric target to leverage against Russia.
American and EU financial regulators should work in coordination to expose and freeze
all Kremlin-linked money associated with organized crime and covert international
political patronage. Further, the U.S. Treasury Department and the European Central
Bank should work in concert to further identify and penalize the oligarchs who support
Vladimir Putin’s regime and enable his foreign adventurism. This could include the
freezing of internationally held assets and issuing personal travel restrictions to oligarchs
as a means of isolating those who enable Putin’s maligning agenda.
In this thesis, I have attempted to answer some of the most preliminary questions
surrounding cyber operations and the impact they can have on electoral processes. In the
course of the research, it became apparent that cyber operations are a broad category in
which hackers and cyber security experts are continuously innovating. Many of these
individual types of cyber operations certainly warrant further research. Alarmingly, the
research has shown that cyber operations, even unsuccessful operations, are likely to have
an impact on public perceptions of elections. Given the covert nature of cyber operations,
I suspect additional details will inevitably emerge which provide greater insight on the
precise impact cyber operations have on electoral processes, but as of this writing, that
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precise impact remains elusive. As the threat associated with cyber operations becomes
increasingly pervasive, it is heartening to see greater acknowledgement and collaboration
across the fields of academia, cyber security and national defense to address this threat.
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Annex A
Additional information relevant to Chapter Six: Quantifying the Effects. Graphic
representation of control group’s changing perceptions:
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Graphic representation of test group’s changing perceptions:
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Annex B
From Chapter Seven: Russia’s International Meddling and Active Measures - An
Interview with a Former Eastern European Official. Interview with Vladimir Lupan in its
entirety:
Interviewer: How would you describe relations between Russia
and Moldova since Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the
European Union in 2014? Can you elaborate on any role Russia may have
in Moldova’s domestic politics with regards to the breakaway region of
Transnistria?
Vladimir: We have attempted several times throughout our history
to approach the European Union, with the idea of becoming a member of
the European Union. Most of the time it resulted in some form of
intervention either by Russian or Moldovan political forces related to
Russia or statements made by Russia itself, because this is how it works in
Moldova. It also works with economic embargos. Russians have
repeatedly introduced embargos which essentially blocked Moldovan
goods from being exported to Russia which was one of its traditional
markets. This happened in 1999 when we had a multiparty agreement
signed and in 2000 when we had a constitutional change. This was when
the Communist Party had to re-register its name to the “Party of
Communists of the Republic of Moldova” and they entered the election on
the wave of economic crisis and nostalgia for the Soviet Union, focusing
on the relation with Russia, not with the European Union. So, for them
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that was the message they sent throughout the election: we will enter a
Russian union as well. As you can see, if you look at the map there is a
problem because in between Russia and Moldova there is Ukraine which
divides us. At that time relations were better between the two, which is a
different issue, however in 2003 due to internal and external pressures the
Party of Communists failed to sign a memorandum which would
essentially put Moldova in Russia’s pocket. Part of this is related to the
way in which Russia has used the Transnistria conflict to maintain
influence in Moldova. It was the Kozak Memorandum. Putin’s chief of
staff was in charge of that agreement, Dmitry Kozak. This agreement
basically provided Russia with veto powers through the separatists, as the
separatists alone had veto power on foreign policy and the Constitutional
Court, when no one else in parament would. It was well known, in the
2000s we were moving closer to the EU. In 1998, there was even a
partnership agreement with the EU and we began negotiating the
partnership agreement in 1994 and it was agreed to in 1998. In 1999-2000
there was an agreement to upgrade the partnership. Moldova only became
independent in 1991 and started negotiating with the EU in 1994 so it was
only three years. Moldova has a history of moving towards the EU,
practically from its independence but Russia showed its true face with the
Kozak Memorandum. What was the purpose of this exclusive veto power
for the separatists? It is to give them autonomy and Russia has influence
over this faction. It’s is purely an attempt to grant them leverage over
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Moldova. They would have the power in the decision process, we called
this the Transnistria-ization of Moldova. Later, you also saw the
Transnistria-ization of Ukraine and the developments were essentially the
same. This process involves federalization which sounds good but the plan
was written by Russia in such a manner to give a small actor veto power
over the larger actor be it Moldova or Ukraine while Russia maintains
influence over that small minority. You can even see these same tactics
being applied in the United States, it’s a different matter but during the
2016 elections there were numerous succession groups in the United
States that were supported by Russia. In this way Moldova is a testing
ground. However, in 2013, in Moldova you saw a backlash both internally
and externally which caused the Party of Communists to reject the Kozak
Memorandum and Russia responded harshly with the embargo of wines
and manipulation of energy, in the form of gas, prices. It was a form of
punishment. You could see Germany paying less for gas than Moldova
even though it is farther from Russia. The EU does not act with a single
voice so it’s much easier to attempt to divide and conquer the member
states. It’s worth remembering that Vladimir Putin was the head of the
KGB an organization that had worked on dividing and conquering Europe
for years.
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Interviewer: You’ve called Moldova a testing ground for Russian
political interference on Twitter and in response to the Russian
disinformation campaigns in July, 2017, the Moldovan Parliament finally
adopted an Anti-Propaganda Law. Can you explain what prompted the
law, how it was justified and received domestically and if you believe it’s
proving effective?
Vladimir: When I say Moldova is a “testing ground” you have to
understand that I’m referring to the use of proxies, and by proxy, I mean a
military that will do the dirty work without wearing your insignia. This
concept is equally applicable in all Russia’s efforts and not necessarily
only military. Try to be more flexible in your thinking. Whatever means
Russia can find in a country to use it against that country, if it is a political
party or a paramilitary, if it’s a struggling population longing for some
specific relation or benefits from Russia then they will become a
paramilitary, if there is a hacker who is interested in making the
government pay a price, for example Edward Snowden and the U.S., then
they will use that against the country. They will use Wikileaks to release
documents or when possible, they will use their own “patriotic” hackers to
release any data when possible. With the anti-propaganda law, this law is
theoretically welcome in Moldova because it is blocking Russian
propaganda, however it is all about implementation and when it comes to
implementation, Mr. Plahotniuc appears in all the news. The news still has
Russian content, or its about Mr. Plahotniuc, [the former chairman of the
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Democratic Party of Moldova and a media magnate] so he essentially
transforms the Russian messaging into political messaging about himself.
This is not even a pre-electoral message, this is essential a propagandistic
message, the type that Russia had been using but he has transformed to
serve himself. The use is duel actually. You block the Russian
propaganda, show the West “look I’m protecting against Russia” and then
he adapts their tactics and uses it against our own population and against
internal enemies. If you look at opinion polling, Mr. Plahotniuc is not very
popular right now, what is important for him, is popularity, he needs to be
elected somehow.

Interviewer: Pro-Russian media in Moldova have been spreading
news of the imminent restitution of historical land and property held by
Ukrainian citizens to Poland and likewise Moldovans having to return land
and property to Romania. According to these fake reports, the Association
Agreements that both Ukraine and Moldova signed with the European
Union in 2014 calls for such restitution. The Association Agreement calls
for nothing of this sort. What effects have such online “fake news” sources
had on Moldova and how can “fake news” propagated online be
neutralized?
Vladimir: It’s funny you mention this. These stories of Moldova
having to give territory back to Romania. Here in New York, I was sitting
with my Russian barber and he asked me about this very issue. He asked
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me why Moldovans would accept giving up territory in order to join the
European Union. I asked him where he had heard this and he pointed to
his television. It was on Russia-1 [a state-sponsored, Russian language
channel carried internationally]. I told him it wasn’t the case which he had
trouble believing. This is occurring all the time and because there are few
channels here in Russian many Russians who live abroad see these types
of reports. They have an effect. There is disinformation but you should
look up the concept of Whataboutism by the journalist Michael Bernard,
its similar to the tu quoque logical fallacy. It is a technique the Soviets
used where if someone says something critical, you change the topic to
something distracting and more preferable. Americans would object to a
specific Soviet human rights abuse and the Soviets would counter with
something like “What about racism in America?” Obviously, both aren’t
good but the objective of the person using Whataboutism was to change
the subject. How can “fake news” propagated online be neutralized? Well,
as we saw, this is difficult. There can be laws but as in Moldova you have
to see the details of those laws.

Interviewer: Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Federal Security Services
(FSB) are believed to have played a part in Russia’s interference in the
2016 US presidential election through online groups respectively known
as “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear” by penetrating the Democratic National
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Committee (DNC) in 2015 and releasing stolen and compromising
information at a time when it would have the greatest political impact.
Have you seen any comparable efforts in past Moldovan elections or do
you suspect they could take place in next year’s parliamentary elections?
Vladimir: In Moldova, the tactics used by Russia are more brazen.
They can use tactics they wouldn’t dare to use in the United States. Rather
than covertly attempting to manipulate an election, they can afford to be
overt in their support of a party or candidates. This is combined with
disinformation against candidates who stand up to Russia or promote
deeper integration with the European Union. In this was the situation is
different between Moldova and the United States.

Interviewer: Russia has a long record of targeting outspoken critics
in an attempt to delegitimize them in the public eye. Considering your
position and outspoken criticism of Russian propaganda campaigns, have
you had any experiences with cyber intrusion or attempts to compromise
your character that you would be willing to share?
Vladimir: This occurred when I was serving as the Ambassador &
Permanent Representative of Moldova to the United Nations over the
Russian involvement in Syria. There were Russian media reports claiming
I had proposed rescinding Russia’s veto authority on the United Nations
Security Council. This is impossible. There is absolutely nothing in the
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UN Charter about removing a Security Council member’s right to a veto.
There is no mechanism for that, so it would be impossible. This was about
building pressure diplomatically. Similar circumstances happened to
others at the UN over Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. As you
know, Moldova is not on the Security Council and even if it was, there is
no way to take away a veto from a Security Council member. It fits a
pattern though, they take elements of truth, in this case, another diplomat
had proposed a resolution in which veto authority would be challenged on
a one-time issue for countries that prevented serious inquires on war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide and shape it to their
purposes.

Interviewer: What are the long-term objectives of Russia’s cyber
aggression and propaganda campaigns?
Vladimir: The purpose of Russian ops is not only to deceive the
West but also to destroy the values of the West. They target our collective
values. They want to destroy the rule of law in these countries. They want
to undermine the EU and NATO. They do this by bashing relations
between countries with things like gas price manipulation and they do it
within countries by bashing certain political parties. It’s about freedom to
act. It’s about realpolitik, when certain national security issues are present,
Russia understands realpolitik well and they use the resources available.
Essentially, Russia sees the United States as a country that can prohibit
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them, for external and internal reasons, from expanding. Therefore, any
attempt by an administration to try to stop Russian actions will actually
face some sort of response. In order to solve a problem, you need to have a
willing partner, that’s the bilateral part of negotiations, you need to agree
on a certain set of actions, up to now I have not seen Russia willing to
stop. What we’ve see is Russia trying to restore its status as a superpower,
which they are incapable of. They are a regional power but not a
superpower, they cannot do more than that.
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